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Introduction   
 
 In this dissertation, we use the “fertility as mobility” approach to study the 
determinants of fertility outcomes in India. More elaborately, we re- examine the 
Beckerian hypothesis of a tradeoff between number and quality of children with 
increasing income levels using the India Human Development Survey (2005) data.  Our 
contention is that it is not necessarily the case that couples at higher end of the income 
scale will have fewer but higher quality children as compared to those lower down the 
income scale. Drawing on the seminal work of Susan Greenhalgh on “fertility as 
mobility” in late nineteenth century traditional Chinese society (1989) and modifying 
Coale’s three necessary and sufficient conditions for demographic transition (1975), we 
argue that even couples lower down the income scale will be willing to invest in quality 
rather than quantity of children if the institutional framework in terms of education and 
employment opportunities enhance mobility prospects. In this chapter, we provide an 
overview and rationale behind undertaking such an exercise as well as highlight our 
contributions to the demographic literature. 
Association between income and fertility outcomes 
 In his seminal work, Becker (1960) uses an analogy of consumer durables to 
suggest that there is a tradeoff between quantity and quality of children. Simply stated, he 
argues that economic theory suggests income and number of children are positively 
associated with each other so that at higher income levels, there is a demand for more 




“quality” children. However, “better” quality children require higher levels of 
investment, monetary or otherwise; so that quality of children must be traded off for 
quantity of children, with the net result that higher levels of income is associated with 
fewer but higher quality children.  
However, the problem with applying the economic analogy of consumer goods to 
children is that while richer people do want better houses, cars and so on, they do not 
necessarily want fewer of those than poor people, extending the same logic to children 
suggests that richer people would want both better quality and more children (Jones, 
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt, 2008).  This logical fallacy is resolved by Hotz, Klerman and 
Willis (1993) who suggest that it is not children per se that are normal goods but 
expenditure on children is- the total expenditure on children are an increasing function of 
income but the income elasticity of demand for number of children is still negative.  
Jones et al. (2008) disagree; they argue that in his original paper though Becker 
emphasizes the trade- off between quantity and quality of children, he does not offer it as 
an explanation of the negative association between fertility outcomes and income level. 
The absence of a positive relationship between fertility and income is then an indication 
of a “missing variables” problem viz., knowledge of contraceptives. The expectation is 
that the adoption of contraception among the high income group accounts for their 
effective planning of their family size vis-à-vis lower income groups and hence, lower 
fertility levels.  
In a subsequent paper, Becker and Lewis (1973) argue that if income is accurately 




relationship is negative- since higher quality children demand more resources; couples 
have fewer children at higher income levels, this makes the relationship between income 
and fertility outcomes to appear negative. Further, Becker and Tomes (1976) argue that 
the quality of children production function has an endowment component, which 
generates a negative association between fertility and income- under conditions in which 
the child’s quality endowment and parent’s ability are positively correlated and the 
marginal value of education is higher among parents with higher wages, one can expect 
fertility to be inversely correlated with income while educational investment is increasing 
in parental endowment (Jones et al., 2008).  
The above discussion summarizes briefly Becker’s hypothesis of a quantity- 
quality tradeoff but it also suggests that the relationship between quantity and quality of 
children and income level is far from a straightforward one- -in the following chapter 
(Chapter 2), we detail the several inadequacies of the Beckerian hypothesis. Indeed the 
debate surrounding the relationship between fertility and income has continued to perplex 
economists, sociologists and demographers alike. It seems, therefore, necessary to 
suggest an alternate theoretical framework that helps us to better understand the 
relationship between fertility and income levels. In order to do so, we study the income- 
fertility relationship from a social mobility perspective. Highlighting income as one of 
the dimensions of social mobility, we propose that contrary to what is suggested by 
Becker viz., couples higher up the income scale are more likely to have fewer children 
but invest more in their quality than couples lower down the income scale- the negative 
association between fertility outcomes and income levels do not hold if the institutional 




employment opportunities are available. In such instances, even couples lower down the 
income scale will be willing to invest in their children so as to be able to access these 
opportunities.  
We use the India Human Development Survey (IHDS, 2005), which is a large 
nationally representative survey of around 41, 000 households and 215,000 individuals 
for our analysis. The analysis of fertility- income relationship using large survey data is 
hindered because not all relevant information is present in the same dataset. For instance, 
DHS or WFS are disadvantaged in that while they collect fertility data, they typically 
leave out data pertaining to educational and health expenditures that is crucial to a study 
of fertility- income relationship. The Indian DHS- National Family Health Survey does 
not have data on expenditure on education on children and income levels which is an 
independent variable in our analysis. In contrast, IHDS has a wealth of data that allows 
researchers to combine fertility data with a host of information on the background of the 
respondents, including income and educational expenditures. 
Broad national level trends in fertility in India 
 A heterogeneous fertility level across different social classes/ groups is quite a 
well- known phenomenon among those familiar with the Indian demographic scene, and 
has also been observed internationally (Yang and Morgan, 2003; Aneshensel, Becerra, 
Fielder and Schuler, 1990; Folmar, 1992). This is best highlighted by a comparative 
assessment of total fertility rates by background characteristics in the different NFHS 
years, even though different rounds of NFHS use slightly different categorization of 




any information about TFR by the standard of living index categories while NFHS- II has 
three standard of living categories (low, medium, high) and NFHS- III (2005- 06) 
provides information by standard of living index quintiles. Nevertheless, two fertility 
trends are distinct from Table 1 below: (1) almost all social classes/ groups have 
experienced a decline in TFR across the different NFHS years and (2) notwithstanding 
the decline in total fertility rates across the groups; in some instances, substantive intra- 
group differences remain. In NFHS- III, for example, women with the lowest standard of 
living have a TFR of 3.89 while those enjoying the highest living standards have fertility 
rates well below the replacement level of 2.1 at 1.8. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 Another particularly striking feature of the fertility decline in India is the regional 
variations. As per NFHS- III data, some states as Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, 
Kerala and Maharashtra have fertility levels at or below 2.1 while in states such as Bihar, 
Uttar Pradesh and some of the North- eastern states it is hovering around 4.0. Nationally, 
the overall fertility level declined from 3.4 to 2.7 but across the states it has been 
declining at greatly varying rates apart from greatly varying levels. For example, in 
Assam it declined from 3.5 to 2.4 while in Rajasthan during the same period of NFHS- I 
to NFHS- III it declined from 3.6 to 3.2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Approaches to study fertility in India 
There is a broad consensus in the literature that the cultural context as defined by 




India (see, for example, Dyson and Moore, 1983, Malhotra, Vanneman and Kishor, 1995, 
Murthi, Guio and Drèze, 1995, Drèze and Murthi, 2001; among others). Greater women’s 
agency and empowerment are correlated with lower levels of fertility. For example, the 
higher status of women and their greater autonomy in South India is believed to have 
contributed towards its lower fertility rates. Tribal populations have distinct kinship 
patterns and gender relations, particularly a higher rate of labor force participation, which 
may be contributing to their lower fertility levels. Total Fertility Rate is also higher 
among the Muslims versus the Hindu population; but it is debatable to what extent this 
holds controlling for the lower levels of socio- economic development among Muslims 
(for further discussion on this issue see Basu, 1997; Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997; Jeffery and 
Jeffery, 2000; Iyer, 2002). The proximate determinants of fertility- proportions of female 
married, prevalence of contraceptive methods, incidence of induced abortion and the 
fertility inhibiting effect of breastfeeding- also conform to the differential patterns in 
fertility by background characteristics and states (Bongaarts, 1982; Visaria, 1999). For 
instance, according to NFHS-III data though marriage is early and almost universal in 
India, the proportion of unmarried women in the ages 20- 24 years is higher in the 
southern state of Kerala (42 percent) as opposed to the north- Western state of Rajasthan 
(14 percent). Similarly, although the use of contraception has gone up throughout the 
country, according to NFHS- III, the range is from a low of 24 percent in Meghalaya to a 
high of 73 percent in Himachal Pradesh. 
In contrast, the empirical evidence of an association between level of 
development and modernization and fertility levels is at best tentative. Murthi and Drèze 




indicators of development as the poverty index, urbanization and male literacy. Female 
literacy has, however, strong and significant association with fertility level and operates 
through several pathways (Murthi et al., 1995, Drèze and Murthi, 2001, Krishnan, 1992), 
including diffusion of knowledge and behavior regarding fertility control measures from 
other contraceptive users (McNay et al. 2003). 
“Fertility as Mobility” perspective   
 While both the cultural discourse of kinship patterns and gender norms and the 
structural discourse of socio-economic development have received much attention; the 
examination of differentials in fertility level from the “social mobility” perspective 
remains unexamined.  We came across only two studies with an India focus that have 
addressed fertility trends in India from a mobility perspective- Basu and Desai (2010) 
offer the desire for securing upward mobility through investment in child’s education and 
thereby securing a place in India’s growing national economy as an explanation for the 
phenomenon of one- child families among the middle classes in the country. In another 
piece, Pallikadavath and Wilson (2005) study the fertility decisions of the Vettuvan 
community- a disenfranchised caste community in Kerala- and conclude that Vettuvan 
parents sought to limit family size to two children- ideally a son and a daughter- to 
maximize their mobility chances. Educational investment on the son is expected to 
increase the chances of upward mobility through a secured employment while education 





 Both these studies are, however, limited in that they focus on a very small 
segment of the Indian population. Only about 5 percent of the families are one- child 
families and Vettuvans are one of the Scheduled Caste communities in Kerala, which has 
better social development indicators than other states in India. It, therefore, becomes 
necessary to see if the broad idea that fertility decisions are influenced by social mobility 
prospects can be generalized for the entire population as well. In this dissertation, we 
develop a theoretical framework that allows us to examine if the association observed for 
small segments of the Indian populations holds for the larger population in India as well. 
Other contributions of the dissertation 
Men’s role in fertility outcomes 
 Compared to the number of studies devoted to understanding the correlates of 
women’s characteristics with fertility outcomes, fewer have focused on studying the role 
of men (Goldscheider and Kaufman, 1996; Forste, 2002). A part of the neglect arises 
because women physically bear children and child rearing has historically been 
considered a woman’s domain. But surveys on fertility/ family formation too tend to 
collect information about women and ignore men; Froste (2002) notes that past surveys 
in the U.S. have focused exclusively on women because men’s reporting of fertility is 
considered to be unreliable. In the West, the lack of data on men’s role in family 
formation and their subsequent parenting means that there is not enough information to 
study such recent developments in the family as growth of non- marital child births and 
marital disruption (Bianchi, 1998; Brown & Eisenberg, 1995; Goldscheider & Kaufman, 




In the context of developing countries, a wealth of information on women has 
allowed us to understand the linkages between fertility outcomes and various background 
characteristics as education levels (Cleland and Rodriguez, 1988; United Nations, 1987; 
Cochrane, 1983; UNESCO, 1983; Weinberger, 1987; Cochrane, 1979), sex preference 
(Arnold, 1985; Das, 1987), and women’s access to income and employment activities 
(Derose, 2002; Mason and Palan, 1981). Research on men’s role in fertility outcomes has 
focused on gender relations within the family and spousal bargaining power (Bankole, 
1995; Basu, 1992; Dyson and Moore, 1983; Dodoo & Tempenis, 2002; Ezeh, 1993; 
Oheneba-Sakyi & Takyi, 1997) but comparatively little research has been done to study 
the association between men’s background characteristics and fertility outcomes. Basu 
(2002), for instance, points out that it is difficult to disentangle whether educated 
husbands reflect the fertility goals of their (educated) wives or they are a group that is 
intrinsically different from their counterparts who have lesser or no education. 
Additionally, given that there is a growing recognition of the importance of educating 
sons across all economic and social sections in developing countries, it is not clear if their 
education reflects a different set of world values or if the association is merely a 
conflation of an association between education and financial resources. Because we use 
an analytical framework where we control for income, we are able to see to what extent 
income is an intervening variable in an association between education of men and fertility 
outcomes.    
Social Mobility in India 
Sociological discussions on social mobility in India typically draw on the work of 




westernization (1952, 1977). The notion of sanskritisation, which is identified as the 
process through which castes manipulate their ritual status and legitimize their upward 
mobility by embracing practices of the “upper” castes such as prohibition of widow 
remarriage or observing purdah or adopting vegetarianism and teetotalism. The other 
strategy towards social mobility involves adopting the secular practices associated with 
westernization, though the attempt to manipulate ritual status through these alternative 
strategies may also conflict with each other- for instance, the greater emphasis on 
providing secular education to women is at odds with the role identified for women under 
sankritisation as primarily the custodians of family status and caste purity.  
While the two variables that we use as markers of mobility- access to education 
and non- agricultural employment opportunities- are distinctly associated with 
westernization, our analysis diverges from the previous discussion since the focus is not 
so much on how individuals or communities manipulate their ritual caste or social status 
to move up the social order, instead the focus is at the individual level, viz., couples 
restricting their family size in order to make the requisite investment so that their children 
are able to access the growing but limited opportunities of upward economic and social 
mobility (Desai, 2007; Desai and Das, 2004) created by India’s growing and increasingly 
globalized economy.  
Other discussions of social mobility in India have focused on alternative 
dimensions of mobility- income, education, wages and occupation across generations and 
within social groups. So, for instance, Kumar, Heath and Heath (2002a and 2002b) focus 
on inter- generational mobility across classes, which they define in terms of occupations- 




skilled labor, manual labor, unskilled labor, farmers and lower agricultural labor. A 
forthcoming article using data from the 2005 India Human Development Survey 
(Moitram and Singh, 2012) also focuses on intergenerational occupation mobility while 
Ray and Mazumdar (2010) study inter- generational mobility in terms of education and 
occupations. In addition to inter- generational occupation mobility, Hnatkovska, Lahiri 
and Paul (2012) also review evidence on inter- generational mobility in terms of income 
and wage while Sethi and Somanathan (2010) present a comparative assessment of social 
mobility among Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes- the two historically 
disadvantaged sub- populations in India. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) take another 
perspective on social mobility in India by examining the role of caste networks in 
limiting mobility. They find that caste networks by imposing restrictions on their 
members often tend to restrict inter- generational mobility.  
In adding a demographic dimension to the discussion of social mobility in India, 
we along with Basu and Desai (2010) and Pallikadavath and Wilson (2005) contribute to 
the rather limited literature on this subject. Additionally, unlike previous literature on 
social mobility, we focus on mobility experience as well as access to mobility 
opportunities, broadening the definition of mobility from a purely objective criterion.   
Chapter scheme in the dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized along the following lines: next chapter (Chapter 2) 
details a review of the literature and outlines our research questions and hypotheses. We 
begin this chapter with a detailed exposition of Becker’s hypothesis on the negative 




economists. Based on these critiques, which essentially point out that fewer children does 
not necessarily imply better quality children and at higher income levels there is no 
automatic demand for fewer quality children, we propose an alternative theoretical 
framework using the fact that income levels constitute one of the objective dimensions of 
social mobility. Our framework proposes that mobility would be a relevant factor in 
fertility decisions if and only if (1) mobility is within the calculus of rational choice, (2) 
mobility is desirable and (3) means to achieve mobility are available. While drawing on 
prior literature on the social- psychological costs of mobility, our framework essentially 
builds upon an earlier work of Greenhalgh (1988) examining the association between 
fertility outcomes and mobility from an “institutional” perspective in China by making it 
more amenable to empirical analysis. The chapter states the research questions and 
hypotheses and sets the stage for studying the association between mobility experience 
and aspirations of couples and fertility outcomes using the latter framework in the 
specific case of India. In particular, we highlight the role of education and occupation as 
vehicles for social mobility in the Indian context and contend that couples who have 
experienced mobility in terms of either being at the upper end of the occupational 
hierarchy (i.e., professionals) or have the high levels of education that is necessary to 
access occupations at the higher end of the hierarchy are most likely to aspire for 
mobility. Additionally, such couples also have the necessary resources (monetary and 
non- monetary) to ensure that their children are able to access these opportunities. The 
result is that net of (couples’) level of education and occupation (of men), the negative 
relation between fertility and income levels is considerably weakened. Furthermore, if the 




and employment opportunities are available), then even those who have not experienced 
mobility in the sense that they are at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy (laborers 
or farmers) or do not have the education to be at the upper end of the occupational 
hierarchy will be willing to invest in the quality of the education of their children; thereby 
attenuating the linkages between fertility outcomes and income levels.  
Chapter 3 provides information on the India Human Development Survey 
(IHDS), which we use for our analysis and the rationale behind using it for our empirical 
analysis. We also illustrate the robustness of IHDS data through a comparative 
assessment of IHDS and other national surveys and census. The subsequent discussion 
provides detailed information about the analytical sample and dependent and 
independent/ control variables, including ways in which each of the variables are 
measured and the expected direction of relationship between the dependent and 
independent/ control variables; and the statistical techniques we use in order to answer 
our research questions and test our hypotheses.   
Chapter 4 presents the results. Broadly, the results support the assertion that the 
hypothesized negative association between income and fertility outcomes is considerably 
weakened when we take into account a couple’s level of education (both men and 
women) and men’s occupational background, which we argue in the Indian context to be 
markers of status. But we only find limited support for the hypothesis that availability of 
education and employment opportunities substantially attenuates the relationship between 




Chapter 5 delves deeper into the first condition we articulated in Chapter 2 for 
mobility to be a relevant factor in fertility decisions- viz., mobility must be within the 
calculus of rational choice. The result that given limited inter- generational occupation 
mobility in India it is not significantly associated with fertility outcomes is hardly 
surprising. More importantly though we find that fertility decisions are significantly 
associated with occupations for couples in which the men are professionals like their 
fathers. 
Chapter 6 reviews the results in light of overall limited support for the hypotheses 
that upward social mobility in Indian context is associated with fertility outcomes. In 
particular, we found that there is little support for the hypothesis that institutional context 
in terms of accessibility to education and employment opportunities attenuates the 
income- fertility relationship while Chapter 5 confirms that because of occupational 
mobility across generations is not widespread it is not a significant factor in most 
couples’ fertility decisions. We reinterpret these findings by drawing on attempts in the 




Chapter 2  
Beckerian Quantity- Quality Tradeoff in “Fertility as Mobility” framework 
 
 In the demographic literature, the Beckerian model of a quantity- quality tradeoff 
forms the cornerstone of any analysis on the role of income in relation to fertility 
outcomes. This dissertation builds on this work to take into account social mobility 
considerations that increase the importance of quality compared to quantity of children. 
Beckerian income- fertility hypothesis 
When economists first proposed new household economics models, the 
relationship between income and fertility posed a great challenge. In many industrial 
societies, richer households had smaller families than poorer households. Unless assumed 
“inferior” goods, standard neo- classical economic theory suggests that at higher income 
levels more number of children will be preferred or that the income elasticity of quantity 
of children is positive. This challenge was addressed by Gary S. Becker by focusing on 
child quality instead of quantity. In his famous 1960 treatise “An Economic Analysis of 
Fertility”, using the analogy that children are equivalent to consumer durables, Becker 
makes a distinction between income elasticity of quantity and quality of children 
demanded.  
Parallel to quantity demand for children, there is the quality demand for children. 
Quality of children is defined as the sum of those traits which may be developed, 
excluding purely biological characteristics like hair color, skin color, sex, etc. At higher 
income levels, couples not only demand more children, but better “quality” children as 




investment or are more “expensive”, therefore, quality must be traded off for quantity, 
with the result that the income elasticity of quantity demand for children appears to be 
negative (Becker and Lewis, 1973).  
The Beckerian framework has its limitations though- sociologists contend that its 
theoretical framework does not capture the social dimensions of the dynamics of human 
reproduction while econometric analysis using instrumental variables does not find 
evidence in support of the hypothesis. Still others have argued that the quantity- quality 
tradeoff is not universal but holds in specific situations/ contexts.  
“Child Quality” is not a Decision Variable 
 The theoretical framework of the Beckerian model of income- fertility 
relationship has, been critiqued on the grounds that the consumer durable analogy to child 
quality is incorrect due to its failure to take into consideration the role of parents as 
“producers” of children and an incomplete cost analysis. Many of these inadequacies 
relate to its failure to take into account the sociological context of reproduction.  
Numerous critiques (Turchi, 1975; Blake, 1968; Duesenberry, 1960) have pointed 
out that the social aspect of reproduction is far more complex than what is suggested by 
the analogy between family size decisions and purchase of consumer durables.  
Unlike the consumer durable market, there is no factor as credit that would restrict 
couples from having any number of children that they desire- that is, they can have as 
many or as few children as they want. Secondly, across most cultures there exists 
tremendous institutional pressure that encourages marriage and children. Couples are not 




unlike consumer durable goods where there is the possibility of adjusting consumption 
behavior to attain consumption equilibrium, couples cannot post- hoc adjust the number 
of children to maximize the utility that they derive from children. Fourth, parents do not 
have any control over the innate characteristics of their children, unlike in a consumer 
durable market where consumers can choose among visible products whose qualities they 
are able to ascertain with some reasonable effort. Finally, parents are under social 
obligations of adequate upbringing of their children; clearly no such obligations exist 
with respect to consumer durables.  
In this dissertation, we elaborate further on the social obligations of parents 
towards the upbringing of their children and the implications it has for the Beckerian 
quantity- quality tradeoff. Most parents are desirous of investing in children so that they 
are sufficiently equipped to access education and employment opportunities necessary for 
upward social mobility. However, since opportunities for upward mobility are not equally 
distributed across various social strata/ income groups, not all parents are likely to 
consider it rational to make such investment. Our contention is that the quantity- quality 
tradeoff in terms of fewer but better quality children is not equally important for all 
parents, but only for those parents who perceive chances of mobility for their children, 
possibly because they have experienced mobility themselves.  
Role of parents as producers of children  
 Yet another critique is that the dynamics of fertility suggested by Becker would 
change significantly if not only the role of parents as “consumers” but their role as 




decide to produce more than one child to achieve, among other things, one of the 
essential elements of child quality viz., the socialized child. Second, parents have to 
adjust the problem of spreading fertility decisions over time so as to be able to overcome 
the problem of “empty nest”. Third, as producers of children parents have to comply with 
societal norms of child quality. Blake (1968) suggests that all these features relating to 
the role of parents as producers suggests that parents, whether rich or poor, are likely to 
prefer more than one child as an alternative to childlessness. Societal norms concerning 
quality of child may impinge more strictly on rich parents; further inhibiting a positive 
association between income and child quality. 
Opportunity cost of children 
Higher income couples are more likely to be under significant social pressure to 
produce “better” quality children. Moreover, the desire for social mobility means that 
parents are likely to overstretch their resources to have children with the requisite 
qualifications. Further, indirect costs in terms of intensive parenting especially common 
among the affluent classes as well as increasingly considered essential in modern 
societies for social mobility also increases the opportunity cost of children (Lareau, 
2003). Blake (1968) critiques Becker for his failure to fully take into account the 
opportunity cost of children. The increasing opportunity cost of children with increasing 
income levels suggests that the association between income and fertility levels may be 
negative. 
Furthermore, feminist critique of Becker’s model of the household, also termed 




1997), is applicable here. With respect to fertility outcomes, what is of importance is not 
only the interaction between husband and wife but the possible impact of older children 
in effecting fertility outcomes (Turchi, 1975).  
Unobserved heterogeneity in parental preferences   
 The “empirical regularity” (Schultz, 2007: 19) in support of the Beckerian 
hypothesis of a tradeoff between quantity and quality of children (see the references cited 
in Clark and Cummins, 2011) is likely due to an inherent endogeneity between family 
size and child quality arising out of unobserved heterogeneity in parental preferences. 
Most studies assume that parental preferences are homogenous, but this may not be the 
case. Some parents may be more willing to invest in the quality of their children than 
others. If this is indeed the case, then the observed association between number of 
children and child quality is most likely on account of a positive association between 
parental preferences and child quality.  
Results from studies adopting the unanticipated birth of a twin as an instrument 
find that the Beckerian quantity- quality tradeoff does not always hold ground and that 
there might well be a positive correlation between parental quality and child quality. 
More elaborately, the use of the random incidence of twin births allows economists to 
disentangle the issue of child quality when there is an unexpected birth- the Beckerian 
model, under these circumstances, predicts a negative association between quantity and 
quality while the alternate hypothesis, which takes into account unobserved parental 
heterogeneity, suggests no association. Indeed, empirical studies adopting this alternative 
methodological approach find that the association between quantity and quality of 




Lavy, and Schlosser (2006) and Qian (2006) who do not find any evidence of quantity- 
quality tradeoff in Israel and China respectively. Li, Zhang and Zhu (2008) report the 
expected Beckerian quantity- quality tradeoff in the Chinese countryside. But as Clark 
and Cummins (2011) note that this result might be influenced by the restrictive fertility 
policies of the Chinese government while Becker’s proposition relates to the relationship 
between quantity and quality of children in free market world. 
Quantity- Quality tradeoff in a developing country  
The empirical observation of a negative correlation between quantity and quality 
of children with rising income levels that is so consistently observed in developed 
countries is not necessarily generalizable to developing countries, especially with 
educational attainment as the outcome variable (Maralani, 2008). Instead the correlation 
varies greatly by time and place and ranges from negative to positive, depending on the 
specific context. For example, evidence from Brazil suggests a negative association 
between family size and educational attainment (Psacharopoulos and Arrigada, 1989). 
Evidence from Thailand too confirms a negative association between family size and 
educational attainment (Knodel, Havannon, and Sittitrai, 1990), but with a qualification-  
the association is negative only for families with six children or more and the association 
is modest when other family characteristics are controlled in a regression framework 
(Anh, Knodel and Treiman, 1998). The reverse is true in Botswana and Kenya, where the 
association between family size and educational attainment is positive (Chernichovsy, 
1985; Gomes, 1984). In India, larger families are more likely to send their children to 
school than smaller families, where children are held back from going to school in order 




chances of going to school and are most likely to be prevented from going to school in 
order to meet the labor demands of the family (Jejeebhoy, 1993). Furthermore, patterns 
are not uniform even within a country- while there is a positive association among Israeli 
Jews, there is no association between educational attainment and family size among 
Israeli Muslims who are far less socio- economically privileged than their Jewish 
counterparts (Shavit and Pierce, 1991; Angrist et al., 2006). In another study based in 
Indonesia, the association between family size and children’s schooling was positive in 
urban areas for older cohorts but negative for more recent cohorts, while for rural areas 
there was no significant association (Maralani, 2008). Also see Buchmann and Hannum, 
2001. 
These studies suggest the importance of context in a study of the relationship 
between family size and quality of children. Among other things, a society’s level of 
development, modes of production and access to schooling may influence the relative 
association of family size on schooling of children (Desai, 1995; Lloyd, 1994; King, 
1987). In certain contexts, the quality-quantity trade-off between number and quality of 
children may not hold, and the desire to have better-educated children may not 
necessarily lead parents to choose smaller families (Gomes 1984; Mueller 1984). 
A similar ambivalence exists when health of children is used as a measure of child 
quality; though the results are not specific to developing countries context. For example, 
Strachan (1989) finds a positive association between quantity and quality of children, the 
tendency to suffer from one or more allergies decreases as family size increases. Using 
twin births as an instrument for family size and height as a measure of child quality, 




cohorts between 1965- 1978 that there is a positive correlation between family size and 
height. While another study in Britain finds that children in large families (3+) are 2.5 cm 
shorter than the average height for their age (Sample, 2007) and Horton (1988) finds a 
similar negative effect of birth order on height for age using a multipurpose survey from 
1978 in the Bicol region of the Philippines. Alternative theories exist to explain the 
differing results between family size and health outcomes (Lundborg et al., 2011). One of 
the hypothesis supporting a positive association between family size and health outcomes 
is the “in utero programming” hypothesis – which suggests that the maternal immune system 
becomes stronger with number of births and that this is transferred to the child in utero 
(Ohfujii et al., 2009); while Horton (1988) explains her results in terms of the inability of 
parents to allocate resources in such a way so as to offset the inevitable advantages 
accruing to children in earlier birth orders who are born when per capita resources 
(financial and in terms of parental time and attention) are greater. (Also see the literature 
cited in Lundborg et al., 2011). 
More broadly, Raut (1985) proposes an alternative to the Beckerian quantity- 
quality tradeoff that may be particularly relevant to a developing country. His proposition 
is that in the short run the poor will tend to have larger families than the rich, not because 
there is an inverse association between income levels and quantity of children, but 
because the poor perceive higher costs of producing skilled children and capital and the 
rich perceive higher costs of producing unskilled children. It follows then that in such an 
economy the poor are likely to specialize in producing unskilled children and hence, have 
large families and the rich are likely to specialize in skilled children and physical capital 




To sum up then, the major critiques outlined here suggest that (1) Lower quantity 
does not automatically lead to higher quality; and (2) Higher income does not 
automatically lead to higher quality demands. 
Beckerian hypothesis restated in a mobility- fertility complex 
What then explains the income-quantity relationship? My argument is that (1) 
income is one of the objective dimensions of mobility and high income is a proxy for 
social mobility. Richer families belong to a social class where parents are expected to 
invest in child quality and here the social cost of low quality children is very high. (2) 
Income fertility relationship varies by external conditions. If external conditions allow for 
achievement of higher quality, parents will curtail fertility, not otherwise. 
Fertility as Mobility 
The argument that there is an association between mobility and fertility can be 
traced back to at least Malthus. It states that small family size is conducive to upward 
social mobility (Dumont, 1890 as cited in Greenhalgh, 1988). The rationale for this 
argument draws upon the property of capillarity or capillary action of liquids in the 
physical world. So, just as gravity necessitates that liquids have to be thin in order to rise 
up in narrow tubes, in the same manner families have to be small in order to rise up the 
mobility ladder.  
Later theorization has, of course, moved beyond this simplistic formulation and 
rather eugenicist orientation (Basu and Desai, 2010) and takes into consideration such 
factors as women’s employment in the modern world, and changing consumption 




Women’s labor force participation, especially in the formal sector, is not 
compatible with child bearing and rearing and therefore, acts as an incentive to limit 
family size (Lloyd, 1991; Jaffe and Azumi, 1960). To the extent that upward income 
mobility in a modernizing society is associated with increased women’s participation in 
the formal labor force, one can expect an inverse association between upward mobility 
and fertility outcomes. Relatedly in societies where institutional structures and social 
norms dictate that women bear the major share of the burden of child bearing and child 
rearing, women have a greater incentive to reduce fertility (McDonald, 2000). However, 
in instances where state and other social institutions provide child care support, this 
relationship may be accentuated (Casper et al., 1994; Mason and Palan, 1981) 
Easterlin’s hypothesis (1969, 1975, 1978), which is framed at the macro level, too 
could be applied at the micro- individual level to predict an association between mobility 
and fertility. It states that the baby boom in the US was caused by increases in the relative 
economic status of couples and the decreases in relative income accounts for the 
subsequent decline in fertility.  That is, if income is high relative to consumption 
preferences, fertility will be high and vice versa. Bean and Swicegood (1979) extensions 
of Easterlin’s hypothesis sees inter-generational upward mobility as increases in relative 
economic status vis-à-vis tastes and preferences formed in parents’ household and 
therefore, is associated with high fertility and the relationship holds true in the opposite 
direction for downward inter-generational mobility. 
Apart from these hypotheses, which emerge from the literature on demographic 
transition, there are several others that lay emphasis on social and psychological 




social isolation hypothesis suggest that social mobility can either augment fertility 
because the process of mobility itself is disruptive of ties with which a couple is 
integrated with the larger society, and mobile couples may have more children as a means 
of reintegration with the social class into which they have entered (Blau and Duncan, 
1967). Alternatively, the stress and disorientation hypothesis suggests that social 
mobility, whether upward or downward, is associated with considerable stress and loss of 
social security leading to depressed fertility. The status enhancement hypothesis predicts 
a negative association between upward mobility and fertility. Westoff (1953) notes that 
the temperament to be mobile leads to a voluntary limitation of fertility because child 
bearing/ child rearing involves resources, both monetary and non-monetary, that could be 
otherwise used for attaining higher social position.  
While all these hypotheses are valid, they are all uni-dimensional in terms of their 
understanding of the association between social mobility and fertility. Davis’s (1963) 
theory of “multiphasic response” recognizes that the process of demographic change is 
far more complex- it is both “reflexive” and “behavioral”. Reflexivity is reflected in that 
a change in one of the components brings about a change in the other components which 
in turn influences the component which induced the change in the first place. The 
behavioral aspect of the process of demographic change is reflected in the human 
decisions involved in the pursuit of various goals, including the goal of getting ahead and 
appearing respectable (Davis, 1963: 352). Or in other words, from the perspective of an 
individual, social mobility influences one’s demographic decisions and behavior and 
family size could be restricted or expanded both in the interest of upward mobility as well 




More recently, drawing from the latter perspective, Greenhalgh (1988) outlines 
what she terms as an “institutional” approach to the study of mobility- fertility linkages. 
It distinguishes itself by emphasizing subjective mobility aspirations as opposed to 
objective mobility. Not only that, it goes beyond the conventional emphasis in the 
literature on the occupational dimension of mobility and defines it broadly to include 
social, economic and political components. Furthermore, this approach sees mobility 
goals to be linked with another key objective that couples have, which is to enhance their 
security. As she puts it, security is “only the first step on the ladder of social 
advancement. Security and mobility form a goal hierarchy, or aspiration ladder, such that 
once security goals are satisfied, actors move on to pursue mobility goals” (Greenhalgh, 
1988: 638). A couple’s fertility behavior is only among a sub-set of behaviors that they 
adopt to achieve a range of goals from security to mobility. Unlike previous theoretical 
formulations, this perspective emphasizes the (instrumental) values of children to parents/ 
couples in achieving the desired security-mobility goals. Finally, in addition to the 
mobility- fertility linkages at the individual level, it emphasizes the institutional 
structures that operate beyond the individuals, which provide the frame of reference for 
their particular goals and strategies. 
Empirical research on fertility- mobility linkages  
Empirical research has abandoned the earlier focus on factors as social isolation, 
stress and disorientation, status enhancement and relative economic status- as the main 
links between mobility and fertility; instead the theoretical perspective offered by 




upon as well as modify further in our attempt to incorporate mobility into the discussion 
on the association between income and fertility outcomes.  
Greenhalgh’s (1988) institutional framework is useful in its emphasis on the 
subjective dimension of mobility and the mediating role of institutions in social mobility. 
Her cultural interpretation of mobility- fertility linkages, with its emphasis on culture- 
“the learned repertoire of beliefs and behavior patterns” (Greenhalgh, 1988: 638) along 
with the social, economic and political institutions in which individuals operate as 
providing the framework for both the security- mobility aspirations as well as their 
fertility behavior in any society, is a holistic approach than the previous one which 
focuses purely on the social- individual linkages. Additionally, by situating fertility 
within the cultural (and institutional) context of security –mobility goals, it provides a 
framework that can be applied to different societies; different time- periods within the 
same society (since the cultural-institutional complex in a society changes from time to 
time); and finally, different classes/ social groups within a society (because different 
social strata within the same society, such as rural and urban, may be faced with different 
cultural- institutional contexts).  
An alternative framework for studying the fertility- mobility complex 
However, while Greenhalgh’s (1988, 1989) work is useful in providing us with 
the institutional frame of reference for individual demographic decisions and behavior 
and their association with mobility, it is difficult to translate her institutional approach 
into empirically verifiable hypothesis. Her own empirical investigation of the mobility- 




her approach to allow for a way in which it can also prove useful for quantitative 
analysis. In order to do so, we borrow from Coale’s (1975) three necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a demographic transition to take place in a country/ community and 
propose the following alternative framework to study fertility- mobility linkages. 
1. Mobility should be within the calculus of rational choice.  
The social stratification literature suggests that the overall mobility structure 
varies across countries and there is evidence in the literature that fertility decisions vary 
according to the mobility experience of couples. Boyd (1973), for example, finds in her 
study of five metropolitan cities in Latin America that variations in fertility by mobility 
experience as articulated in terms of past and present career statuses of husbands in four 
cities- Bogota, San Jose, Panama City and Caracas. See also Kasarda, Billy and West 
(1986) and the studies cited therein.  
Therefore in order to be associated with fertility outcomes, mobility must be 
within the calculus of rational choice among couples. Social mobility would be a factor in 
fertility decisions if and only if couples consider upward mobility to be achievable. This 
means that mobility has a lesser role in fertility decisions in hierarchical societies, which 
do not allow much scope for mobility.  
2. Mobility should be desirable.  
Not only should mobility be achievable, but it should also be desirable; in the 
sense that the costs of mobility (such as stress associated with the process of upward 
mobility or social isolation caused by the inability to integrate with the new social class at 




case of fertility) should not be so high so as to outweigh its benefits.  In her study, Boyd 
(1973) concludes that of the five cities in Metropolitan Latin America under study- 
Bogota, Columbia, San Jose, Costa Rica, Mexico City, Mexico, Panama City, Panama 
and Caracas, Venezuela, the absence of a significant relationship between mobility and 
fertility in Mexico City, which was the least economically developed of all cities under 
study, suggests that the disruptive effects of mobility may have been offset by the 
importance attached to family networks.  
In further analysis Boyd (1973) argues that the evidence of a relation between 
mobility and fertility in developing countries- see Poti and Datta’s (1960) study in West 
Bengal (India) and Hutchington’s (1961) study in Brazil; and its absence in developed 
countries-  Scott  (1958), Berent (1952), Boggs (1957), Tien (1965), Westoff, Potter and 
Sagi (1963, 1961), Blau and Duncan (1967) and Featherman (1970)- is associated with 
the social structure in these two broad sets of countries.  Her contention is that the social 
structure is more hierarchical and rigid in developing as compared to developed 
countries, with the result that social mobility is a far more stressful process in the former 
than the latter. One implication of the stress associated with the mobility process in 
developing countries is that it has an adverse impact on fertility level. Developed 
countries, on the other hand, have a relatively less hierarchical social structure and social 
mobility is more institutionalized and is, therefore, less stressful; with the outcome that 






3. Means to achieve mobility must be available.  
Given that mobility is within the calculus of rational choice as well as is desirable, 
means to achieve mobility must be available also. Not everyone may have equal access to 
opportunities to achieve mobility. A number of intervening factors mediate the process of 
social mobility so that the chances of mobility are not equally shared by all (Ganzeboom, 
Treiman and Ultee, 1991). Even claims of similar mobility patterns across industrial 
nations, as suggested for instance by Kuznets (1966), are not supported by empirical 
evidence. See, for example, Western and Wright (1994) for a comparative study of 
mobility in two north American countries- USA and Canada, and two Scandinavian 
countries- Norway and Sweden and Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) for a 
comparative study of Sweden, England and France, among others. Within nations 
differentials in ability to achieve mobility is likely to vary across race or class or 
geographical locations. For example, in the US, Hertz (2006) finds that the rate of 
upward income mobility is far lower for African Americans. African American children 
who are born in the bottom quartile are nearly twice as likely to remain there as adults as 
are white children whose parents had identical incomes, and are four times less likely to 
attain the top quartile. Furthermore, these differences persist even after controlling for a 
host of parental background factors, children’s education and health, as well as whether 
the household was female-headed or receiving public assistance. 
It follows, therefore, that if there are differentials across social groups/ contexts in 
terms of their means to achieve mobility, the extent to which it is taken into account as a 




condition for mobility to be a factor in fertility decisions is that not only should it be 
within the calculus of rational choice and be desirable, it should also be achievable.  
This alternative framework while providing three empirically testable hypotheses 
on mobility- fertility linkages also retains useful features of Greenhalgh’s (1988) 
institutional framework. One, by virtue of being empirically tested, they can be used to 
examine the association between mobility and fertility in any cultural contexts. Second, it 
allows investigation of the macro- micro linkages, an individual’s chances of mobility are 
affected by the overarching institutional structures while fertility decisions and outcomes 
are at the individual level. The macro- micro linkages are most explicit in the third 
statement since it allows for differentials in access to opportunities of mobility across 
social groups and thereby, provides the scope to investigate if and to what extent 
mobility- fertility linkages vary across social groups. 
In the subsequent sections, we discuss education and occupation mobility in the 
specific context of India. The rationale for focusing on India stems from the opportunity 
it provides to study a variety of situations ranging from the very poor to the very rich, the 
highly educated to those without any education, there is also considerable variations in 
terms of educational and employment opportunities. Additionally, we also highlight the 
role of subjective expectations about mobility. Our core argument is that education and 
occupation are markers of social status in India. Opportunities for mobility as evident 
from access to education opportunities are not equitable across various social strata/ 
income groups. There is also very little inter- generational occupation mobility and not all 
groups share similar optimism about mobility. Under these circumstances, we contend 




couple’s mobility experiences and/ or their perceptions about mobility for themselves and 
their children. 
“Fertility as mobility” in India: Role of Education 
Discussion on social mobility in the Indian context is framed around the concepts 
of “westernization” and “sanskritization” (Srinivas, 1952). This discussion stresses that 
the strategies adopted for upward mobility involve the emulation of the practices, 
institutions and values of the dominant caste group in a particular region (or what has 
been referred to as “sanskritization”) as well as the adoption of “secular” or “western” 
values (or “westernization”). Acquisition of formal schooling is one of the ways in which 
“secular” or “western” values associated with Westernization can be imbibed.  
In a more recent context of neo- liberal economic policies followed in the country 
over the last 20 years, Basu and Desai (2010) highlight the importance of educational 
investment as a vehicle for upward mobility for middle class parents with one child. 
While the above mentioned economic policies have generated rising opportunities and 
aspirations, they also necessitate the acquisition of good “quality” education to access 
these opportunities. However, given the poor quality of public education, most parents 
rely on private education to meet the demands of quality education. But private education 
is extremely prohibitive. In this scenario, limiting family size is the rational decision for 
middle class parents to maximize investment in the education of their children.  
Pallikadavath and Wilson (2005) also reach a similar conclusion in the context of 
fertility among the disadvantaged castes (Scheduled Castes) for the state of Kerala. They 




fertility is lowest for the most disadvantaged caste group. Vettuvan parents believe that 
the ideal family consists of 2 children- 1 boy, 1 girl. This strategy maximizes their 
chances of social mobility in the context of limited resources and a patrilocal stem 
family, with strictly partible patrilineal inheritance (i.e., all sons are expected to inherit on 
an equal basis and daughters marry out and become part of the households of their 
husband). While sons and daughters are both valued, their expected role towards social 
mobility is gendered- sons through a high status job and daughters through a “good” 
marriage. Education is essential to meet these twin objectives. But more than one son is 
not desirable because under the system of strictly partible patrilineal inheritance it will 
lead to division of already small landholdings while more than one daughter is likely to 
lead to difficulties because of the dowry burden it places on parents. 
The above paragraph highlights the role of education as an instrument for social 
mobility, but there is also well- established evidence that access to education is nowhere 
near equitable in India. For instance, persons placed lower down the caste hierarchy as 
well as in the income scale do not have the same access to education opportunities as 
those occupying positions higher in the caste hierarchy or from economically well- off 
backgrounds. Similar evidence also exists in terms of differentials in rural- urban areas 
and regional locations. These differentials in access to education opportunities are 
reflected in differential educational outcomes across social groups and economic classes. 
Table 3 and Table 4 below from the India Human Development Survey, 2005 highlights 
this disparity in terms of various educational outcomes. While 71 percent of the forward 
caste children aged 8- 11 years in the survey could read, the comparable percent for 




also Desai et al. (2010) and Drèze and Sen (2002) among others for evidence on disparity 
by caste, income and place of residence in other development outcomes. 
[Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
“Fertility as mobility” in India: Role of Occupation and Occupational Mobility  
Occupational rigidity in the Indian context is associated with caste affiliations, 
where in each caste is associated with specific occupations. Under this system, caste that 
are placed higher up the hierarchy are typically associated with occupations up the 
occupational hierarchy, while those down the caste hierarchy are associated with 
occupations lower down the hierarchy. Dalits or former untouchables were particularly 
assigned menial and manual occupations. Further, these occupations were passed from 
one generation to the next and there was little scope of mobility. Modernity is expected to 
weaken the traditional grip of caste on occupational mobility through three pathways 
outlined below. 
The “liberal theory” of industrialism, as developed by various American theorists, 
holds that the chances of mobility are higher in industrial as opposed to pre- industrial 
societies (Kerr et al, 1960, 1973; Kerr, 1969, 1983; Dunlop et al, 1975; Parsons, 1960, 
1967, 1971). Essentially a functionalist theoretical framework, this theory argues that 
industrial societies have certain distinctive characteristics that set them apart from 
traditional societies in terms of offering higher rates of social mobility. These distinctive 
features of industrial societies which aid social mobility can be usefully thought of as 




One of the key structural features of industrial societies is technology. 
Technology in industrial society is not only advanced vis-à-vis pre- industrial ones, but is 
also changing rapidly. Advancing and rapidly changing technology makes three- fold 
claims on the structure of social division of labor: it calls for highly differentiated 
division of labor and continuous and rapid changes in the social structure of division of 
labor, which manifest itself in high rates of mobility both across generations and within 
one’s lifetimes. The best empirical evidence of such high rates of mobility is perhaps in 
the declining share of active population in agriculture and a corresponding increase in 
their share in the manufacturing and services sector of the economy during initial stages 
of development. As the economy develops further and with rapid technological 
advancement, this trend intensifies- employment in the manufacturing and services sector 
grow rapidly and there is an even greater emphasis to upgrade skill levels (Kuznets, 
1966).  Thus, though some skills are rendered obsolete with economic development/ 
modernization, one can expect that the overarching trend in an industrial society is of an 
increase in the number of jobs and occupations requiring sophisticated skills with the net 
result that upward rather than no or downward mobility is more likely both from an inter- 
generational and a work- life perspective. 
In contrast to the above economic rationale behind greater upward mobility in 
industrial versus pre- industrial society, there is also a sociological explanation which 
emphasizes the shift away from ascription (caste in the Indian context) towards 
achievement with industrialization. Here the argument is that unlike in pre- industrial 
societies where one’s social origins (as, for example, denoted by the kinship ties into 




industrial societies the achievement of an individual, most important of which is the 
educational achievement, plays an important role. The increasing demand for qualified 
personnel means in industrial societies means what a person can “do” is emphasized 
more than what s/he is born into. It is this emphasis on “merit” rather than the previously 
restrictive emphasis on ascribed status that provides individual in industrial societies as 
compared to traditional ones more chances for upward mobility. 
Finally, there is a compositional effect that aids upward mobility in industrial 
society. The expansion of the economy is associated with an increasingly important and 
rapidly expanding role of the manufacturing and services sector; both of which require 
personnel with specialized skills and therefore, an increasing emphasis is placed in these 
sectors on educational achievement and/ or occupational degrees. While the role of the 
manufacturing and the services sector expand, the role of the agricultural sector- where a 
greater emphasis is placed on kinship based networks- diminish. This compositional 
change associated with an expanding manufacturing and services sector and a shrinking 
services sector too aids upward mobility in industrial as compared to pre- industrial 
societies. 
Theoretical frameworks outlined above leads us to expect a high degree of 
mobility in modern India, but this is not borne out by empirical evidence. Recent 
discussions using survey data (Kumar et al, 2002a) finds that majority of the sample 
retain the same profession as their fathers (67 percent). Upward mobility is experienced 
by around 19 percent of the sample, 7 percent experienced downward mobility and 
another 7 percent experienced horizontal movements. Jhilam and Mazumdar (2011) 




was upwardly mobile in 2004. Furthermore, there has been little change over time. Driver 
(1962) using data from interviews with 1 percent of the male heads of households in 
Nagpur district concluded that inter- generational occupation mobility is frequent but 
confined to occupations of similar rank. Kumar et al (2002b) analysis comparing inter- 
generational mobility in 1971 with 1996 corroborates limited mobility, though such 
mobility was somewhat greater in 1996 (71 per cent remained in their father’s 
occupation) than in 1971 (75 percent remained in their father’s occupation).  
There is also evidence that education mobility across generations has not 
manifested itself into inter- generational occupation mobility. Jhilam and Mazumdar 
(2011) find in their study that about 48 percent and 56 percent of children in 1993 and 
2004 have higher educational levels than their parents. The corresponding percentages for 
upward occupational mobility are 9 to 13 percent in 1993 and 11 to 15 percent in 2004. 
“Fertility as mobility” in India: Role of Subjective Expectations 
This line of reasoning draws from a strand of literature in economics which 
suggests that parents who have higher subjective expectations about returns from 
education, which may differ substantially from actual returns from education, are more 
likely to make investment in the education of their children (Jensen 2010; Attanasio and 
Kaufmann, 2009;  Nguyen 2008).  
Maertens (2011) based on child level data collected from three villages in 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh suggests that not every parent has an idea about the 
potential return from education. The probability a parent has some idea of returns to 




number of educated people known and the parent’s own education. Among parents who 
had some idea of the returns from education, expectations with regard to the returns for 
their own children’s education differ by region, gender of the child and caste. Girls and 
persons belonging to SC/ ST communities are expected to earn less.  
Additionally, social customs too influence the perceived returns from education. 
In the South Asian context, the practice of exogamy and early marriage reduce parental 
incentive in making educational investment in their daughters (Foster and Rosenzweig, 
2001; Field and Ambrus, 2008). 
Research Questions 
In this dissertation, we exploit the alternative framework outlined above to 
analyze income- fertility linkages under the overarching framework of mobility in the 
Indian context. We use the Indian context because the mobility structure can only be 
context specific.   
Using empirical data from the India Human Development Survey (2005), we 
examine the association between income and fertility outcomes and the extent to which 
the association is modified when we take into account dimensions of a couple’s mobility 
experiences and aspirations. The research questions are thus stated as follows: 
R1: What is the association between income and fertility outcomes in India?  
 We have highlighted in the previous paragraphs the role of education and high 




investigates the role of these two markers of social status as well as instruments of social 
mobility in modifying the income- fertility relationship. 
R2: To what extent is the association between income and fertility outcomes in the 
Indian context due to the association between income and two markers of social 
mobility viz., educational attainment and occupational status? 
 The previous section highlights the role of subjective expectations in motivating 
investment in children’s education, differential access to “quality” educational 
opportunities and limited occupational mobility in the Indian context. Our third research 
question, therefore, examines the role of institutional context in modifying the fertility- 
income relationship.    
R3: To what extent the institutional context of mobility modifies the mobility-
fertility relationship through their influence on the prospects of attaining social 
mobility? 
Research Questions stated as Hypotheses 
 These overarching research questions have been further broken down into the 
following testable hypotheses.  
H1: In absence of controls, income is negatively associated with fertility. 
H2: The relationship between income and fertility is at least partly due to the link 
between income and social mobility and hence, the income coefficient will decline with 
the addition of factors associated with mobility such as education and occupational status.  




a. greater investment is required in the form of educational expenditure to 
ensure mobility. 
b. mobility potential is greater. 
 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) study in India with twins as a means of 
identification found that family size (as induced by birth of twins) has a negative effect 
on children’s educational attainment in a small sample (25 twins in approximately 1,600 
children). This study suggests that there is evidence that the Beckerian quantity- quality 
tradeoff holds in the Indian context (H1).  
Our contention is that higher the level of education of couples (we are particularly 
interested in the education of men), greater will be the willingness to invest in the 
education of their children, even after controlling for income. We hypothesize that an 
individual’s educational attainment is a marker of both an aspiration for and an 
experience of social mobility. We have highlighted that one of the roles of education in 
the process of social mobility is in terms of access to high status occupations 
(Pallikadavath and Wilson, 2005)- high educational attainment is necessary to access 
high status occupations. Because presumably these couples have themselves experienced 
the mobility that education offers in terms of access to high status occupations, they will 
also be willing to invest in the education of their children. Additionally, in the context of 
rapid privatization of education and excessive reliance on homework, those with higher 
education are able and willing to invest in their children’s education (Leibowitz, 1974).  
We hypothesize that occupations higher up the occupational hierarchy will have 




professionals, professionals are expected to have the lowest fertility (Abu- Lughod, 1964, 
Kahl, 1968). Here too the reasoning is similar to that of level of education. Professionals 
are likely to have acquired skills through formal education, which in a modern society 
qualifies them for better jobs. Other occupation groups in contrast are most likely to 
acquire skills either through informal apprenticeship and/or they inherit land or family 
business/ proprietorship. By virtue of being at the top most end of the occupational 
hierarchy, professionals are most likely to be willing to invest in the education of their 
children so that either they retain their occupational status across generations or they 
move further up the occupational hierarchy from lower- end professionals (for example, 
clerks) to upper- end professionals (for example, doctors). Moreover, they are in the best 
position to ensure that their children get high quality education and have social networks 
that will ensure higher paying jobs.  In sum then, their own experience of being at the top 
of the occupation hierarchy as well as their desire to ensure that their children are 
professionals is reflected in their willingness to invest in the “quality” of their children 
via educational investment.  
At the other end of the spectrum, we expect fertility to be highest among farmers 
and/or laborers. As an occupation group, they are a binary opposite to professionals. They 
are likely to have had very limited formal education, their skills are based on informal 
apprenticeship and their chances of securing a job in the modern economy is limited. 
Their own experience of upward mobility is limited and they do not hold much hope of 
upward mobility for their children as well. Under these circumstances, they have little 
incentive to invest in the formal education of their children and therefore, they are not 




may be “rational” for them to have more children since they can be expected to 
contribute to family income from an early age (Caldwell, 1976).       
Our third hypothesis deals with the institutional context of mobility- as defined by 
the amount of educational investment, availability of educational and employment 
opportunities and the ways in which it shapes mobility aspirations.  We hypothesize that 
the overall context of educational expenditure indicates the willingness to invest in 
children’s education 1) partly because public school systems are so inadequate that 
private education and private tuitions are required and 2) partly because extra educational 
investment is perceived to be necessary (either in the form of private schooling or private 
tuitions) to gain a competitive edge in India’s growing but highly competitive economy 
(Hypothesis 3a). The latter in turn relates to mobility aspirations of parents for their 
children. We have noted in prior paragraphs that occupations are a marker of social 
mobility and the instrumental role of education in accessing occupations higher up the 
hierarchy. We contend that even when households do not themselves incur a large 
expenditure on education, the fact that they reside in a context where there is on average 
a high expenditure on education is likely to influence their perceptions about the value 
and need for education investment, including the potential social mobility benefits from 
investing in the education of their children. Couples residing in these areas are likely to 
be conscious of the need to invest in the “quality” as opposed to “quantity” of children 
and therefore, will have lower desired and actual fertility.  
Following similar lines of reasoning, availability of education and employment 
opportunities influences the mobility aspirations of all in a community. Such an 




mobility themselves perceive a chance of mobility for their children that come from 
access to education opportunities and availability of employment opportunities and 
hence, find a rationale for investing in the quality vis-à-vis quantity of children 
(Hypothesis 3b). In other words, in areas with access to education and employment 
opportunities, the association between fertility outcomes and levels of income is further 
weakened.  
Table 5 below summarizes our hypothesis in terms of the direction and strength of 
the association between income and fertility outcomes. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 has outlined the theoretical framework which forms the backdrop to our 
dissertation. Subsequently, we have also stated the research questions and the hypothesis 
that we propose to examine in this dissertation.  We hope we have successfully 
demonstrated in this chapter the theoretical contribution of this dissertation to the 
literature on income- fertility relationship by bringing into the picture the context of 
social mobility. Our contribution to the literature is also in terms of modifying 
Greenhalgh’s institutional framework for fertility- mobility analysis to one that is 
amenable to quantitative analysis, while at the same time retaining all the useful features 
of her framework.  We proceed in the next two chapters to describe the data we use to 
test our hypothesis (Chapter 3) and present empirical evidence on our hypothesis 






Data and Methods 
 
 In the previous chapter, we stated our research question and hypothesis. This 
chapter discusses the data; the dependent, independent and control variables and outlines 
the research methods and designs.   
Data 
In order to carry out our analysis, we use household survey data, India Human 
Development Survey (IHDS, 2005). IHDS is a multi- topic survey of 41,554 households 
across 33 states and Union Territories in India, only the small island states of Andaman 
and Nicobar & Lakshadweep are excluded. Of a total of 593 districts (Census of India, 
2001) in India, 383 were included in the sample. The number of villages in the sample is 
1,504 and the number of urban blocks is 970. The sampling procedure adopted in the 
survey aimed to ensure a nationally representative sample (Desai et al., 2009). The 
districts were selected using stratified random sampling to represent a range of socio-
economic conditions. Villages and urban centers and households were selected using 
appropriate population proportional sampling techniques. Table I in the Appendix gives 
district wise coverage of total, rural and urban sample in IHDS. 
One way to assess the overall representativeness of IHDS is to compare it with the 
census data and other nationally representative surveys as the National Sample Surveys 
and National Family Health Surveys. Table 6 below compares some of the key variables 




[Table 6 about here] 
The comparative distribution of the IHDS sample with other national surveys and 
census confirms the robustness of IHDS data. The IHDS sample distribution is consistent 
with distribution from other surveys on most of the variables presented in the table. This 
is especially true for certain key variables measuring individual or household 
characteristics like percent literate, residence, religion and caste. With respect to other 
variables differences could either be on account of wording of questions (such as percent 
of households owning TV, LPG use, using electricity) or due to special efforts made in 
IHDS vis-à-vis other surveys to collect data on certain variables (such as work 
participation rate for women). 
A wide array of topics including sources of income, consumption expenditure, 
education and health have been covered in IHDS for a sample of 41, 554 households. 
Additionally, it asks 33,482 ever- married women in ages of 15- 49 years questions 
pertaining to their fertility behavior and history. While collection of fertility data in India 
is not unusual in itself since other nationally representative household surveys and even 
the census collect detailed fertility data, the uniqueness of the IHDS (2005) is in terms of 
the additional household (such as caste and assets) and individual- level (such as 
education and income) information it collects that helps us to study the correlates of 
fertility outcomes or decisions.  
Sample 
The analytical sample is restricted to married men who are above 18 years but 




studies of fertility outcomes have focused on married women, but we choose to restrict 
our sample to married men. This allows us to examine the relatively less investigated role 
of men in fertility outcomes (Goldscheider and Kaufman, 1996; Forste, 2002). Further 
given that a small proportion of the Indian women are in the labor force (Desai and Das, 
2004), it seems reasonable to focus on a men’s occupation in a study examining the role 
of occupations in modifying the income fertility relationship in India. 
The primary reason for restricting the sample to married men is that almost all 
fertility in India takes place within marriage. This is also the reason behind an upper age 
limit of 59 years for men in the sample. The maximum age of women in the sample is 49 
years, assuming a maximum age gap of 10 years between husband and wife, it seems 
reasonable to restrict the maximum age for men to 59 years. We restrict sample to 
married men who are above 18 years of age and whose wives were interviewed. Those 
below 18 years are simply too young for a study on fertility outcomes (the legal age at 
marriage is set at 18 years for women and 21 years for men). Table 7 illustrates the loss 
in terms of sample size with the above restrictions.  
[Table 7 about here] 
We recognize that this limits our sample- 16, 311 women of reproductive age who 
either do not have husbands or do not have husbands of ages 15 to 49 are excluded. But 
given our focus on the linkages between social mobility experience and aspirations and 
childbearing, we believe this is a justifiable exclusion.  
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics analogous to the one presented in Table 6 




sample and two groups of women- women in the analytical sample and women in the 
reproductive ages who are not in the study sample. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 shows that men in the study sample (N= 31, 419) are comparable to men 
in the study age range but excluded from the analytical sample because their wife were 
not interviewed in the household survey (N= 12, 134) on demographic characteristics as 
percent literate and caste/ religious background. There is also considerable similarity with 
respect to access to amenities as electricity, flush toilets and use of LPG.   
But there are differences between the two samples as well, which probably relate 
to the fact that men in the excluded sample are more likely to reside in joint households 
and hence, their wives were not interviewed in the household survey (IHDS only 
interviewed one eligible woman in the households studied). Thus, the latter have a larger 
household size (7.92) than the study sample (5.62). This also explains as to why the 
excluded sample tend to belong to households that tend to be poor (3 percentage point 
difference) and are located in rural areas (6 percentage point difference). Work 
participation rate is higher in the study sample (94.33) than in the excluded sample 
(88.80), a 4 percentage point difference. The excluded sample also has a lower access to 
piped water (5 percentage point difference) but has a higher ownership of TV (3 
percentage point difference). But these differences are not large and because the study 
and the excluded sample are similar on other key characteristics, we proceed in our study 




There are fewer differences between women in reproductive ages who are and are 
not included in the sample. Women in the analytical survey mostly report the same 
background characteristics as men because they live in the same household and 
traditionally women after marriage belong to the same caste and religious community as 
their husbands’. As expected they report lower literacy and work participation rates. 
Women in reproductive ages who are not in the study sample also report a profile similar 
to their counterparts who are part of the sample. However, because most of these women 
are between the ages 15- 18 and still in school, we find that the excluded sample reports 
higher literacy rate and lower work participation rate.  
Dependent variables 
We use two alternative measures of fertility so as to take into account both the 
demand for children (fertility preferences) and the supply of children (fertility behavior). 
Ideal number of children is a measure (albeit imperfect) of demand for children in two 
ways: among young couples or those who have not been married for a long period of 
time, it allows us to measure their fertility goals since their current family size is not a 
reflection of their true fertility objectives. At the other end, for older couples (even 
though there is a tendency to ex- post rationalize the presence of existing number of 
children) who have either under or over achieved their fertility goals, it allows us to 
measure their true fertility goals. Current number of children because it reflects actual 
fertility is a measure of supply of children. 
 Apart from capturing the entire gamut of fertility behavior in terms of demand for 




is any modification of fertility behavior over time. For example, based on one’s life 
experiences a couple may revise their estimation of ideal number of children. In such 
instances, focusing on one of the measures of fertility will fail to give us an accurate 
picture of the linkages between mobility and fertility.  
IHDS allows us to measure both fertility preferences and fertility behavior. In this 
dissertation, we use the total number of desired children (FP5). Current number of 
children is calculated from the fertility history of woman respondent recorded on page 26 
of the Education and Health Questionnaire. 
However, while the measurement of current fertility is straightforward, the 
measurement of ideal or desired fertility poses a challenge to demographers. The 
fundamental critique is that there may be no real difference between desired and actual 
fertility but that the concept of a gap between these two measures is an artifact of survey 
measurement or data analysis (Casterline and Sinding, 2000; Pritchett, 1994). For couples 
at the end of their reproductive cycle desired fertility preferences may be a reflection of 
modern norms. Yet another point of concern is that each of the possible measures of 
desired fertility has their own validity problems. For instance, World Fertility Surveys 
(1972- 1984) measured desired fertility in terms of wantedness of the previous birth. 
Subsequent longitudinal survey data, however, shows a tendency to ex-post revise  
estimates in favor of wantedness of existing children (Bankole and Westoff, 1998).  
Nevertheless, the validity of the concept of a gap between desired and actual 
fertility is now well- established (Pritchett, 1994) and in this dissertation we proceed to 




in the Education and Health Questionnaire on page 28. Question 20.5 asks the respondent 
the following: 
“If you could go back to the time you did not have any children and could choose 
the number of children to have in your life, how many would that be?”  
 
This line of questioning is similar to that used in Demographic and Health 
Surveys though IHDS does not allow for a non- numeric option “up to God”. The 
responses are disaggregated in terms of ideal sex composition of the desired number of 
children, but for the purposes of this dissertation we use total number of desired children. 
While the shortcomings associated with this measure are well known- there is a tendency 
for ex- post rationalization of current fertility and child mortality risks are not explicitly 
recognized (Bhushan and Hill, 1995), the question works well because it is simple and 
easy to understand. 
The other question in IHDS useful for measuring desired fertility is the 
willingness to have additional children, which did not work for our purposes because it 
was asked to women only if they were not currently pregnant.  
 
Key independent variables 
Log of personal income 
The first hypothesis (H1) in Chapter 2 states that in the absence of controls, 
income is negatively associated with fertility. We use log of personal income as the key 




Instead of asking households to report their annual income, IHDS collects 
information on various possible sources of income- net farm income (Section 4 of the 
household questionnaire), income from wages and salaries (Section 6 of the household 
questionnaire), net family business income (Section 7 of the household questionnaire), 
property and pension incomes (Section 8 of the household questionnaire). This 
information is then used to compute a composite measure of personal income for each of 
the household members who reported working in either of the above mentioned activities. 
Farm income, for instance, is divided among different members of the household based 
on hours they reported working on the farm. In keeping with standard econometric 
techniques, we use log of personal income rather than its actual value in the regression 
models.  
Importantly, we use current income as a proxy for income at the time of 
childbearing. However, given the context limited income mobility for majority of the 
population in India (Drèze, Lanjouw and Stern, 1992), current income provides a good 
proxy for income at the time of birth. 
Because IHDS is the first major national survey to report a measure for income, 
there is no available national estimates of comparisons of income and fertility outcomes. 
National Family Health Survey (NFHS) provides estimation of fertility levels by wealth 
index. Simple cross tabulation using NFHS- III confirm the expected negative association 
between the wealth index and fertility level. Couples higher up the wealth ladder have on 





[Table 9 about here] 
Men’s years of education 
The second hypothesis in Chapter 2 (H2) states that the relationship between 
income and fertility is at least partly due to the link between income and mobility and 
hence, the income coefficient will decline with the addition of factors associated with 
mobility such as education and occupational status. We thus have two independent 
variables here- level of education and occupation status. 
Education in IHDS is recorded in terms of years of education completed on page 
17 of the household questionnaire, with 15 years indicating college degree or more. 
Question 10.5 asks the respondent the following: 
How many standard years has [NAME] completed? 
  Table 10 compares desire to stop childbearing by number of living children for 
men and women with different education background. Unlike previous National Family 
Health Surveys, NFHS-3 is unique in that both men and women are asked questions 
about desired fertility. NFHS- 3 confirms a negative and linear association between 
education and fertility level. For example, the percent of men who have 1 child and 
would not want to have any more children increases from 23 percent for illiterates to 37 
percent among those with 12 years or more years of education. The corresponding 
percentages for women are 21 percent among illiterates and 39 percent among college 
educated. 





Hypothesis 2 in Chapter 2 states that occupation status modifies the fertility- 
income relationship.  
Occupation of household members in IHDS is not recorded through a single 
question. Rather it is based on the member’s participation in different possible income 
earning activities in the year preceding the survey. A respondent is assigned an 
occupation depending on his/ her income source. The survey collects information on the 
following sources of current income- agriculture (Section 4 of the household 
questionnaire), income from wages (agricultural and non- agricultural) and salaries 
(Section 6 of the household questionnaire), and finally, business (Section 7 of the 
household questionnaire). Thus, a respondent is classified as a farmer if (s)he reports 
working on the family farm in the year preceding the survey. Collection of data on 
multiple income sources also gives the option to a respondent to report multiple income 
activities. For example, a person in rural India may have combined work on his/ her own 
farm with either or both agricultural and (or) non- agricultural labor. In cases (around 5 
per cent of the sample) where an individual has reported multiple jobs (and hence, 
occupation), we have taken the job that contributed the highest to household income into 
consideration. 
Occupations are recorded in two-digit codes, which are the same ones adopted by 
the office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner at the time of 1991 census. 
These codes range from 00 to 99. Since 99 occupation categories is not feasible for 




professionals, businessmen, farmers, laborers and others. See Appendix Table II for the 
detailed census occupation classification and how they have been collapsed into 5 
occupation categories.  
A study in Bangladesh (Bhuyan, 1996) found that laborers had highest average 
ever born children (4.19), followed by agriculturalists (farm owners or cultivators) (3.24), 
businessmen (1.71) and finally, those in service (1.97). Analysis of fertility behavior by 
occupation of father from Egypt (1947) found only one occupation group consisting of 
professionals- engineers, doctors, officers and technicians- had fewer children than other 
occupational groups. There was no significant difference in terms of number of children 
among other occupation groups (El- Badry, 1956 as cited in Abu- Lughod, 1964). On the 
other hand, Kahl’s 1964 comparative study of ideal family size among Brazilian and 
Mexican men found that ideal family size is highest for low manual occupations. The 
study (Kahl, 1968) found that on average sons of “high non- manual workers” had 
completed secondary education and nearly 50 percent of the sample had even higher 
levels of education. The corresponding averages for sons of “low manual workers” and 
“high manual workers” were incomplete secondary and “low manual workers” was 
incomplete primary. This also suggests that among all professional groups the dilemma 
posed by the “quantity- quality” tradeoff in fertility decisions is most severe for the 
professionals; and they are likely to have fewer children so as to be able to invest in their 
education. 
There is comparatively little information from Indian secondary sources on 
fertility differentials across occupations and much of it is dated. Nevertheless, they do 




according to the Sample Census of Births and Deaths, Uttar Pradesh, 1953- 54, the 
completed fertility for women aged 45 years and more is 5.63 for agricultural laborers, 
6.14 for agricultural land holders and tenants, and 6.31 for non- agricultural laborers. In 
his own study in rural parts of Uttar Pradesh, he finds that occupation and caste interact 
with each other to produce fertility differentials. Brahmins or Kshatriyas in agricultural 
occupations have higher fertility as compared to men in agricultural occupations 
belonging to other castes/ religious groups. Rele also notes that the proportion of 
landowners among those who are in agricultural occupation is higher for Brahmins or 
Kshatriyas than other groups. When the occupational composition of all household 
members is considered, the fertility in household with all working members in agriculture 
is lower than those in which either or some of the members are in non- agriculture.  
Expenditure on education as a proxy for investment on child quality  
Hypothesis 3a in Chapter 2 states that in areas where education costs are higher, 
the quantity- quality tradeoff associated with increases in household income levels will be 
weakened. In order to test this hypothesis we categorize states into three categories- high, 
medium and low- according to the average expenditure on education. This categorization 
allows us to capture if residence in states with high education expenditure levels as 
Kerala as compared to low expenditure states as Bihar creates a context of willingness to 
invest in the “quality” of children, after controlling for income, education, occupation and 
other background variables. The rationale for choosing states as opposed to districts or 
villages as the unit of analysis when the dependent variable is the overall average 
expenditure on education is that there are likely to be greater inter- state variations in 




villages within a state. This is probably because under the Indian constitutions states as 
opposed to districts/ villages can legislate on education, which affects the availability and 
cost of education services within the entire jurisdiction of a state.  
The IHDS collects information on three categories of education expenditure- 
expenditure on school fees, private tuitions and miscellaneous expenditures as books, 
school transportation and school uniform (page 5 of the Education and Health 
Questionnaire). These three expenditures have been added to compute the total 
expenditure on education. The average expenditure for all children in the IHDS sample 
who report expenditure on education is Rs. 1926.14/-. Highest average expenditure on 
education is reported in Punjab at Rs. 4166.90/- while the lowest average expenditure is 
reported in Assam at Rs. 944.03/-.  Average education expenditure by states is given in 
Appendix Table III. We use this information to categorize states by levels of total 
expenditure on education. The high expenditure states are those where the average 
household expenditure on school fees is Rs. 3000/- and above. Himachal Pradesh, 
Haryana, Punjab, the North- Eastern states (barring Assam), Kerala and Jammu & 
Kashmir are in this category. The low expenditure states with average household 
expenditure on school fees below Rs. 2000/- are Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Rajasthan, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, Orissa and Maharashtra (including 
Goa). The remaining states are medium expenditure states with average expenditure on 
education between Rs. 2001/- and Rs. 3000/-.  






 We now proceed to elaborate on each of the control variables we use in the 
regression models. We briefly discuss the rationale for including the particular variable as 
a control in the analysis, the expected direction of relationship with the outcome variables 
and how they have been measured in IHDS.  
Caste/ religious background 
 There are well- documented differences in demographic, education and health 
outcomes by religious groups in India. For example, compared to Hindus, Muslims have 
higher infant and child survival rates, child sex ratios, life expectancy, and maternal 
mortality (Government of India, 2006), but have lower literacy rates. These empirical 
evidences of differences support the control for couple’s religious background in an 
analysis of their fertility behavior.  
Caste system has been the organizational principle of the Indian society for 
centuries; and a priori fertility differential among the various caste groups is to be 
expected.  Moreover, while the concept of caste originated within Hinduism, it has 
permeated as a principle of social organization to other religious groups as well. Caste 
groups that have been historically discriminated such as the former “untouchables” have 
on an average worse demographic, education and health outcomes vis-à-vis the more 
privileged caste groups (that is, castes traditionally marked to be on the upper end of the 
hierarchy). 
The IHDS uses an eight- fold classification of caste/ religious background: 




ST (Scheduled Tribes), Other Upper Castes, Muslims, Christians and Other Minority 
Religions. This eight- fold classification allows for persons from religious groups other 
than Hinduism to identify with any caste groups, if they so wish. While this approach is 
useful because it takes into account that caste as a mechanism of social organization 
exists in other religions as well, a detailed examination of fertility trends by these caste 
categories is complicated because post- independence censuses and other survey reports 
do not use the same caste classification- particularly, Brahmins are not classified as a 
distinct group from the upper castes nor do they give other minority religions the option 
to identify their caste affiliations. But pre- independence estimates suggest that Brahmins 
have lower levels of fertility than the rest of the population (Davis, 1946). Based on this 
evidence and national level estimates presented in Table 12, we expect fertility levels to 
be lowest among the Brahmins and highest among the Muslims, followed by SCs. We 
also expect that other minority religious groups have fertility levels lower than or 
equivalent to the Brahmins. 
[Table 12 about here] 
It must be noted though that there is considerable state level variations from the 
national level trends. For example, as per estimates from NFHS II the fertility among the 
SC population in Kerala is lower (1.52) than that recorded for the state as a whole (1.96). 
NFHS III confirm these figures- fertility rate for women who do not belong to SC/ ST/ 
OBC at 2.2 children is higher than for women belonging to SC and OBC (at 1.3- 1.7 
children).  A similar observation is also true for the Hindu- Muslim fertility differential- 
Muslim fertility in some states as in Kerala (1.5) is lower than the All- India fertility 





 Fertility is, of course, negatively associated with women’s age. It is also necessary 
to control for women’s age to take into account that younger women are not likely to 
have realized their ideal fertility; while levels of actual fertility for older women may not 
reflect their desired fertility.  
Current residence 
 It is generally acknowledged that fertility in urban populations is typically lower 
than in rural ones. Broadly speaking, various structural factors and cultural norms in rural 
communities can be thought of as conforming to the high fertility patterns characteristic 
of pre- industrial societies while those of urban communities to the low fertility levels 
characteristic of societies experiencing demographic transition or of post- industrial 
societies. Factors that contribute to higher fertility in rural areas include higher levels of 
infant mortality (and therefore, the need to offset it with high levels of fertility), 
predominance of subsistence agriculture (and the greater demand for children to carry out 
agricultural work), lower levels of education (which is inversely related to fertility 
through various pathways such as higher costs of rearing children and a greater emphasis 
on “quality” as opposed to “quantity” of children, lower infant mortality on account of 
better health and sanitation knowledge/ practices, greater knowledge of contraceptive 
methods, greater chances of paid non- agricultural employment and therefore, higher 
opportunity cost of mother’s foregone income, delayed age at marriage, etc.), prevalence 
of cultural norms as universal marriage, emphasis on children as a source for old age 




Evidence from India on rural- urban fertility differential conforms to the expected 
differential in rural- urban fertility pattern. According to various rounds of the National 
Family Health Survey, the Total Fertility Rate (15- 49 years) is 3.64 for rural areas and 
2.70 for urban areas in NFHS- I (1990-2); 3.06 and 2.27 for rural and urban areas 
respectively in NFHS II (1996- 8); and 2.96 and 2.06 for rural and urban areas 
respectively in NFHS III (2003- 5).   
In addition to rural residence, residence in urban areas can be divided into two 
further categories- residence in metro cities and in other remaining urban areas. We 
expect fertility level to be lowest for couples residing in metro cities, followed by other 
urban areas and rural areas. We distinguish between metro cities and other urban areas 
because compared to other urban areas, metro cities (Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, Chennai, 
Hyderabad and Bangalore) enjoy better standards of living, opportunities for female 
employment are greater and there is greater acceptance and use of contraceptive methods; 
raising the costs of child rearing and child bearing and reducing the demand for children. 
Data from IHDS confirms this hypothesis (Desai et al., 2010). Of the households in metro 
cities, 90 percent have access to electricity for 18+ hours in a day; the comparative 
statistic for other urban areas is 69 percent. Fewer women in metro cities as compared to 
other cities are married before the age of 18 (38 percent versus 47 percent). Under- 5 






Ordered logit models 
In order to test Hypothesis 1 through Hypothesis 3a (refer Chapter 2), we use 
ordinal logit regression models since the dependent variable is ideal number of children 
and current number of children. We run step- wise regression models, where we 
introduce the key independent variable in the first model and examine how its effect on 
the dependent variable is mediated with the addition of controls in the subsequent 
models.  
  Model 1 is the first model, with just log of personal income as the independent 
variable. We expect it to be negatively and significantly associated with fertility 
outcomes as per our expectations stated in Hypothesis 1.  
Model 2 adds background control variables as caste, wife’s age and current 
residence in the model. While still negative and significant, the coefficient for log of 
income in Model 2 is expected to be smaller than the coefficient in Model 1. Model 3 
adds men’s years of education. As per Hypothesis 2, we expect the coefficient for log of 
income to be still smaller than in Model 2. Finally, Model 4 is the full model- it 
introduces men’s occupation in the model. Following Hypothesis 2, we expect the 
coefficient for log of personal income to be the smallest in Model 4.  
[Table 13 about here] 
We run another set of regression models with men’s current state residence as the 
key independent variable in order to test Hypothesis 3a. In this instance, Model 1 is the 
same as Model 4 in Table 13 with the exception that for the sake of parsimony 




laborers and others are combined together to form the reference category of “non- 
professionals”. The results in Model 1 are, therefore, expected to mirror those in Model 4 
in Table 13. 
In Model 2, we introduce a variable which categorizes couple’s residence into 
low, medium and high expenditure states in terms of their expenditure on education. 
Model 3 is the full model with the interaction of couple’s current residence categorized in 
terms of high, medium and low expenditure states and men’s occupation. The interaction 
term helps us to capture the extent to which the overall context of high expenditure on 
education creates a climate in which even couples who do not necessarily have the 
resources to be able to spend on education (that is, the men are non- professionals) are 
aware of the need for greater investment in children and therefore, have fewer children.  
Following the reasoning of Hypothesis 3a, the association between log of personal 
income and fertility outcomes is expected to progressively reduce in size as we introduce 
the key independent variable in Model 2 and the interaction term in Model 3. We also 
expect fertility to be lowest in the high expenditure states, followed by the medium and 
low expenditure states. Compared to non- professionals in medium and low expenditure 
states, non- professionals in high expenditure states in Model 3 will have lower fertility. 
We expect fertility to be highest among non- professional in low expenditure states. 





Hierarchical Linear Models  
Hypothesis 3 in Chapter 2 states that the relationship between income and fertility 
will be weaker in areas where mobility potential is greater. 
In order to test this hypothesis we introduce a set of hierarchical linear models, in 
which individuals are nested within villages/ districts, to assess how employment and 
education opportunities influence overall fertility levels. We contend that couples in 
communities that have better employment and schooling opportunities are likely to 
perceive better chances of mobility for their children and therefore are likely to opt for 
smaller families to be able to make the desired education investment necessary to access 
them.  
We estimate two- level hierarchical linear model using the statistical software 
HLM. We estimate a village level model for each of the dependent variable- desired and 
actual fertility- that incorporates village level data from the census and IHDS (2005). A 
second set of models separately for rural and urban areas of a district incorporate census 
information on districts. Given that districts and villages are distinct administrative units 
in India as well as that villages and districts (including rural parts of a district compared 
to its urban parts) often reflect distinct social, cultural and historical realities, they form a 
convenient unit of analysis at the community level (Desai and Andrist, 2010). The HLM 
analysis is based on an unweighted sample because the IHDS sample was selected in a 
stratified design in which states and districts were the main axis of stratification and the 




There are 15,895 men at Level 1, and 1,417 villages at Level 2 and 15, 891 men at 
Level 1 and 265 rural and urban districts at Level 2.  
[Table 15 about here] 
We start with a baseline model with no covariates (Model 1). This model simply 
allows us to partition variance between villages/ districts (alternatively communities) and 
couples within a village. Background characteristics of men are introduced in Model 2 to 
provide a basic description of variation in fertility at the couple level. Model 3 through 
Model 6 introduces a new Level 2 variable each time while dropping the previous Level 
2 variable from the model, so as to help us see the extent of reduction in Level 2 variance 
with the addition of each new variable in the model. Model 7 is the full model that 
combines all the Level 2 variables from Model 3 through Model 6. 
Stylistically, we estimate the following model in which the first equation models 
fertility outcomes at the level of the couple and the second equation models district-level 
intercepts: 
Yij = Π0j + Π1j × X1ij….Πnj × Xnij + εij 
Π0j = β0 + β1j × Y1j…βmj × Ymj × φj, 
where Yij represents fertility outcomes for a couple i in district j; Π0j is the intercept for 
district j; X1ij – Xnij represents the 1 to n characteristics of a couple i in district j that 
influence their fertility outcomes; Π1j – Πnj represents the corresponding Level 1 
coefficients that indicate the effect of characteristics X1 – Xn on fertility outcomes; εij is 




the various 1 to m district-level indicators that we discuss in details below; β1j.. βmj are 
the corresponding Level 2 coefficients that indicate the effect of indicators Y1 – Ym on 
fertility outcomes; and φj is the district-level random effect. 
Employment and Educational Opportunities in a Community 
 Availability of employment and educational opportunities in a community are the 
key independent variables of interest in our regression models. We describe below how 
each of these variables have been constructed. 
Employment prospects in a village/ district 
In Model 3, we introduce at Level 2 variables that capture the communities’ 
access to employment opportunities. As argued in Chapter 2, employment opportunities 
capture the mobility opportunities available within a community. Our expectation is that 
communities that have access to better employment opportunities and hence, better 
chances of mobility will have overall lower fertility levels than those who do not have 
access to such opportunities.  
For district level models, this is captured through percent of farmers and percent 
of laborers in the respective rural and urban areas of a district computed from 2001 
census. For village level models, we introduce village level information on employment 
prospects collected as part of the IHDS (2005).  
In addition to the household survey, the IHDS (2005) collected village level 
information in the villages surveyed. A total of 1501 villages were surveyed as part of 




details of the village in terms of number of hamlets and their composition in terms of 
caste and religion, land usage and prices of essential commodities. In this dissertation, we 
make use of the information on employment opportunities and infrastructure facilities 
available in the village. Specifically, the village questionnaire asks a well- informed 
person in the village such as the village headman to report on the kind of employment 
opportunities available in and within commuting distance of the village. We use this 
information to construct a dummy variable (V_AGR) that takes on a value 1 if there are 
only agricultural opportunities available in and around the village. For all other villages, 
it has a value of 0.  
We hypothesize that the percent of farmers and laborers in a district is indicative 
of employment opportunities in a district. Higher the percent of farmers and percent of 
daily laborers in a district, lower are the opportunities of more lucrative non- agricultural 
employment. We expect it to be negatively associated with fertility outcomes. Similarly, 
if a village has access to only agricultural opportunities, it indicates that the chances of 
mobility via employment are lower and therefore, the tradeoff in such villages with 
respect to quantity and quality of children is not as sharp as in other villages, which have 
access to both agricultural and non- agricultural employment opportunities. Villages that 
score 1 on V_AGR will have higher fertility levels than villages that score 0.  
Schooling opportunities in a village 
  For village level models, we introduce availability of private schools and drop the 
previous variables on employment prospects in Model 3a. We introduce this variable on 




models because while all districts have private schools, not all villages have one. 
Presence of private schools in a village, therefore, allows us to measure availability of 
schooling opportunities. This is the only variable that is specific for village level models, 
all other variables are measured at both the village and district level. 
The presence of private schools is indicative of a greater parental demand for 
“quality” education for their children (De, Noronha and Samson, 2002). While almost all 
villages have access to government schools, not all villages have access to private 
schools. Based on IHDS data, Desai et al. (2010) compute a mean school index for 
village access to government and private schools. It stands at 1.95 for government 
schools and 0.75 for private schools. It is our contention that parental demand for private 
schooling for their children is at least partly motivated by the perception to invest in 
quality of children so that the latter are able to access mobility (employment) 
opportunities. We hypothesize that in villages with access to private schools there would 
be a greater consciousness about the importance of investing in quality of children and 
hence, lower fertility levels even when parents do not themselves send their children to 
private schools. 
 The IHDS records the presence of private schools in its village survey (see page 8 
of the village questionnaire). It records if there is a private primary, middle, secondary or 
senior secondary school. We create a dummy variable for the presence of private school 
in a village. If there is either a private primary, middle, secondary or senior secondary 





Other contextual factors 
 In addition to our key independent variables, we control for a number of 
contextual factors at the level of the community- women’s labor force participation, 
demographic variables (percent of literate women and percent of population belonging to 
marginalized caste and tribal communities) and level of infrastructural facilities in the 
village.  
Women’s labor force participation in a village/ district 
In Model 4, instead of indicators about employment prospects, we add census 
information about women’s labor force participation - percent of women who are main 
workers and percent of women who are marginal workers. The Indian census defines 
marginal workers as those who have not worked for a major part of a year (that is, less 
than 183 days a year or six months).  
Overall women’s employment can be expected to be negatively associated with 
fertility outcomes (see Mason and Palan, 1981 and the literature cited therein). The 
rationale for introducing a variable controlling for district/ village level employment of 
women in a study that explores the association between fertility outcomes and mobility is 
that districts with higher employment of women are more likely to be aware of the 
possible employment opportunities for their daughters and hence, more likely to be faced 






Demographic indicators  
In Model 5, we drop the variable on employment prospects and instead introduce 
census information on percent of female literacy at the village/ district level. Our 
rationale for including percent female literate in the hierarchical linear models is that it 
defines the overall context of fertility in a village/ district. In making this assertion, we 
draw from a previous study by Desai and Alva (1998) wherein the authors highlight the 
role of the community context in attenuating the association between maternal education 
and child health. We similarly argue that the percent of literate women shape the cultural 
norms pertaining to fertility levels in a community. Villages or districts with higher 
literacy among women are likely to be the ones where there is a greater recognition 
among community members about the importance of women’s education and given that 
women’s education has an inverse association with fertility outcomes (see Drèze and 
Murthi, 2001 and the literature cited therein), we expect communities with higher level of 
women’s education to have lower fertility levels. 
We noted earlier in the chapter that persons who belong to Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribe communities typically report higher fertility rates than those belonging 
to other caste communities. Lower levels of socio- economic development is well 
documented among these two marginalized communities (World Bank, 2011). And given 
that low socio- economic development is often associated with high fertility levels (Kirk, 
1996), our hypothesis is that to the extent the percent of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled 
Tribes in a community is reflective of overall socio- economic development in a district/ 
village, villages/ districts with a higher percent of persons belonging to either of these 





In Model 6, we drop the previous information on demographic characteristics, and 
instead introduce a variable that captures infrastructural amenities in the community. 
Availability of infrastructure is reflective of overall economic development in a 
community. Moreover, in the present context, infrastructural amenities also highlight the 
availability of road/ transportation and communication services necessary to access 
employment opportunities. Our hypothesis is that communities with better infrastructure 
facilities will have lower fertility levels. 
For village level models, we introduce three amenities indices- a (physical) 
infrastructure index, a social index and a program index. These indices are based on 
information in the village questionnaire about access to infrastructure facilities 
(infrastructure index), credit organizations, women’s organizations, development 
organizations and caste based organization (social index) and access to government 
programs (program index). The details of the items that constitute these indices are 
presented in Table 16. The village is assigned a point for the presence of each of these 
infrastructure facilities, organizations and government programs. We expect each of these 
indices to be negatively associated with fertility outcomes. 
[Table 16 about here] 
Unfortunately, we do not have such corresponding information at the level of the 
district. Instead for rural areas of a district we compute an amenities index from 




census information and for urban areas of a district we use percent population in urban 
areas as a proxy measure of infrastructural amenities. 
Full model 
Finally, Model 7 is the full model with all the covariates from Model 3 through 
Model 6 and allows us to study potentially confounding effects. Table 15 indicates two 
sets of full models- Model 7 and Model 7a. Model 7 is the full model for district level 
hierarchical linear models. It does not include schooling opportunities, which is a variable 
specific to village hierarchical models. 
Conclusion 
 Table 17 summarizes the discussion in this chapter in terms of the research 
hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2. For each of the three hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2, 
Table 17 gives us the key independent variable(s), control variables, if any and statistical 
methods that we use to test the hypotheses. For example, we use hierarchical linear 
modeling to test Hypothesis 3b, which states that the relationship between income and 
fertility will be weaker in areas where options for mobility are available. The key Level 2 
variable is the presence of private schools in the villages, which is a proxy for availability 
of educational opportunities in the villages. There is no corresponding variable for 
district- level models. Employment opportunities are measured by the percent of 
farmers/laborers in the district (for district models) and a dummy for the presence of non- 
agricultural employment opportunities in the village (for village- level models).   




Now that we have detailed our data and methods, we proceed to Chapter 4 in 





Chapter 4  
Fertility- Income Linkages in the Indian Context  
 
 We saw in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 that economic theory suggests income is 
negatively associated with levels of fertility. Becker (1960) famously explains this 
negative association using the classical utilitarian framework in which having children is 
akin to purchasing consumer durables with high income elasticity for both quantity and 
quality, though the income elasticity of quantity is greater than that of quality. At higher 
income levels, families demand both more units and better quality of a consumer good. 
That is, while at higher levels of income, couples are more likely to desire more children, 
they have to constantly trade it off with the quality of the children that they are going to 
raise; on a given income. However, the rationale behind this reasoning has been 
questioned on the grounds that it fails to take into account the social context of 
reproduction while economists point out that the direction of causality is not clear- the 
association between family size and income levels may be due unobserved heterogeneity 
in parental preferences. Also, there is evidence that the Beckerian model cannot be 
applied universally, in certain contexts such as in developing countries it may not hold 
true.  
We argue in Chapter 2 that our contribution to the literature is in terms of placing 
the Beckerian quantity- quality tradeoff with increases in income in the context of 
“fertility as mobility” framework. Chapter 3 detailed the data and the methods we 
propose to use to reexamine the tradeoff between quantity and quality of children from a 




As discussed in Chapter 3, we utilize stepwise ordinal logistic regression to evaluate the 
association between income level and fertility outcomes taking into account an 
individual’s level of education and occupation. We then examine to what extent the 
institutional context in terms of demand for education and employment opportunities 
modify the association between income level and fertility outcomes. We use both ordinal 
logistic regression models and hierarchical linear models in our analysis. Specifically, we 
use hierarchical linear models to study the contextual role of education and employment 
opportunities in modifying the association between income and fertility levels.   
Association between fertility outcomes and level of income, in the absence of controls 
The first step in our analysis is to see if a simple association between fertility 
outcomes and level of income holds true.  
Table 18 gives a cross tabulation of level of household income
1
 and fertility 
outcomes. This simple tabulation utilizes income quintiles reported in IHDS, 2005 based 
on household (and not personal) income for all households in the sample. The cut- off 
points for the income quintiles are Rs.14, 000, Rs.22, 950, Rs.36,098 and Rs.69,000 
(Desai et al., 2010). A small percent (around 1.5 percent) of households have reported 
negative incomes. These households are not necessarily poor households, the negative 
incomes could well be losses incurred as part of business ventures.  These households are 
also included in the data tabulation below as a separate category. 
[Table 18 about here] 
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There is a steady but small decrease in average ideal number of children with 
increases in income. Desired fertility is on average 2.55 children among the lowest 
quintile while it is around 2.22 children among the most affluent (or the fifth quintile). 
With regard to living number of children, the average number of children remains 
roughly the same at around 2.5 though the standard deviation is higher for living than 
desired number of children at more than 1 child for each of the quintiles. In the case of 
desired number of children, it is less than 1 child for each of the income quintiles in the 
range 0.7- 0.8. 
Model 1 in Table 19a and Table 19b examine the association between fertility 
outcomes and income level in the absence of controls in a regression framework. The 
coefficients describing the association between log of personal income and fertility levels 
are negative and statistically significant (Model 1, Table 19a and Table 19b). The log 
odds of desired family size are 0.292 times smaller for each unit increase in log of 
personal income (p < 0.01). The corresponding coefficient for living number of children 
is -0.139 (p < 0.01). The negative and significant relationship between income and 
fertility outcomes confirms the first hypothesis (H1) as stated in Chapter 2. In the absence 
of any controls, increasing incomes is associated with fewer children so as to increase 
investment in the quality of children being raised.  





Association between fertility outcomes and level of income, controlling for men’s 
background characteristics 
Model 2 in Table 19a and 19b evaluates if the negative association between 
fertility outcomes and income levels still hold, when we control for a couple’s 
background characteristics. As outlined in Chapter 3, these background variables are 
caste, wife’s age and residence
2
.  
The size of the income coefficients is lower in Model 2 than in Model 1 for both 
desired and actual fertility but it is still negative and significant. The coefficients are -
0.122 (Model 2) and -0.292 (Model 1) for desired number of children in Table 19a and -
0.120 (Model 2) and -0.139 (Model 1) for living number of children in Table 19b. Thus, 
as implied by Hypothesis 1, there is a negative but weaker association between fertility 
outcomes and income levels when we control for a couple’s background characteristics as 
caste, wife’s age and current residence.  
Associations between desired and actual fertility levels and caste shows that as 
expected (refer Chapter 3) Brahmins desire and have fewer number of children than 
Other Backward Castes (OBC), Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and 
Muslims. Christians have lower desired and actual fertility levels than Brahmins. Other 
“upper” castes Hindus and other religious minorities report statistically non- significant 
differences with Brahmins with respect to desired and actual fertility. On an average, 
Muslims have the highest fertility levels. The widest gap in fertility outcomes is between 
Muslims (β= 1.486 in Model 19a and β= 1.348 in Model 19b) and Brahmins (β= 0.00). 
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 Simple cross tabulation of fertility outcomes by caste, wife’s age and residence are provided in Appendix 




Muslims are followed by somewhat similar levels of fertility among Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Castes. Other religious minorities (Jain and Sikh) 
and Christians report lower fertility levels than our reference caste group, Brahmins. 
Women in older age groups report higher desired and actual fertility as compared 
to women in ages 18- 23 and older the woman, higher is the ideal and living number of 
children. This is a combination of secular changes in fertility as well as the greater time 
older women have had to have children. Thus, the log odds of desired family size is 1.039 
times higher for women of 35 years or more  as compared to women in ages 18- 23 (the 
reference group, p< 0.01). The corresponding log odds of desired fertility (as compared to 
the reference category) for women in ages 30- 34 years and 24- 29 years are 0.737 and 
0.326 respectively. The log odds for living number of children are 1.869 for women in 
ages 24- 29, 2.749 for women in 30- 34 and 3.438 for women 35 years or older (p <0.01).    
Rural areas report the highest levels of desired and actual fertility. The log odds of 
desired fertility are 0.729 times and 1.219 times lower for other urban areas and metro 
cities respectively (p < 0.01). The corresponding log odds for living number of children 
are β= -0.403 and β= -0.680 for other urban areas and metro cities respectively. The 
coefficients are statistically significant at p < 0.01.  
Association between fertility outcomes and level of income, controlling for men’s years 
of education and background characteristics 
The next step in the study of the association between fertility outcomes and 
income is to take into account men’s education in a regression framework along with 




expectation as articulated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is that addition of years of 
education in a regression model further diminishes the size of the income coefficient but 
it would still be inversely and significantly associated with fertility decisions
3
.  
The regression results indicate that the income coefficients in Model 3 (Table 19a 
and Table 19b) remain negative but are considerably smaller than in Model 2 for both 
desired        (β= -0.044, p < 0.01) and actual (β= -0.033, p < 0.01) fertility. Years of 
education has the expected negative and statistically significant sign with both the 
fertility outcomes (β= -0.0531, p < 0.01 for ideal number of children, β= -0.574, p < 0.01 
for living number of children). Thus, as Hypothesis 2 suggests educational attainment 
weakens the association between income and fertility.  
Other background variables have the expected signs with the outcome variables- 
desired and living number of children. 
Association between fertility outcomes and level of income, controlling for men’s 
occupation, years of education and background characteristics 




With the introduction of this new variable in the model, income though still 
negative is not significant either for desired (β= -0.013) or living number of children (β= 
-0.007).  
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 The bivariate association between fertility outcomes and years of education is given Appendix Table VII. 
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All occupation groups have higher and significant (p < 0.01) levels of fertility 
than professionals. Thus, the log odds of desired fertility among businessmen is 0.236 
times higher than professionals, followed by farmers (β= 0.400), laborers (β= 0.302) and 
a miscellaneous category of others (β= 0.169). The corresponding coefficients for actual 
fertility are 0.418 for businessmen, 0.489 for farmers, 0.305 for laborers and finally, 
0.253 for others. Men’s years of education and other background variables have the 
expected relationship with fertility outcomes. 
Overall the results confirm our expectations that the Beckerian story of a negative 
association between fertility outcomes and level of income is on weaker grounds when 
we introduce years of education and occupation along with other background 
characteristics (caste, wife’s age and current residence) in a regression framework (H2).   
Association between fertility outcomes and level of income, controlling for education 
expenditures 
 The next set of regression equations (Tables 21a and 21b) examines how the 
relationship between fertility outcomes and level of income is modified, when we 
introduce a control for expenditure on education typically incurred by the families living 
in the same state. But first Table 20 presents average fertility levels by states categorized 
in terms of expenditure on education as high, medium and low expenditure ones. 
[Table 20 about here] 
 Table 20 indicates that contrary to our expectations desired fertility is lower in 
medium (2.18) than high (2.36) expenditure states and there is not much of a difference 




Actual fertility in high expenditure states is 2.35, which is marginally higher than the 
corresponding average in medium expenditure states. But there is a wider gap between 
desired and actual fertility in medium (2.18 and 2.25) states when compared to high (2.36 
and 2.35) expenditure states. As expected low expenditure states have the highest level of 
both desired (2.65) and actual (2.61) fertility. 
 Model 1 in Table 21a and Table 21b is similar to Model 4 in Table 19a and Table 
19b. Unlike the detailed occupation categories in Table 19a and Table 19b, for the sake 
of parsimony, occupations are collapsed into two categories of professionals (includes 
professionals and businessmen) and non- professionals (includes farmers and laborers) in 
Table 21a and Table 21b. The results of these models, therefore, parallel those in Model 4 
in Table 19a and Table 19b. We find that in the presence of background controls, men’s 
years of education and occupation affiliation, the size of the income coefficient is much 
smaller than if these additional controls were absent.  
Controlling for expenditure on education in Model 2, we find that for both of the 
dependent variables- desired and actual fertility- log of income is no longer statistically 
significantly associated with fertility outcomes. This is also true in Model 3, where we 
interact current residence in terms of high, medium and low expenditure states with 
occupation groups (that is, professionals versus non- professionals).  
 The results in Model 2 and Model 3 confirm the descriptive statistics presented in 
Table 20. There is no statistically significant difference between the high and medium 
expenditure states in terms of actual fertility, but desired fertility is lower in medium than 




states have higher fertility levels than those in medium and high expenditure states. Thus, 
the log odds of desired fertility is 0.993 times and of actual fertility is 0.641 times higher 
in low expenditure states than high expenditure ones (p <0.01). 
Further, the interaction of state wise ranking in terms of expenditure on education 
and fertility outcomes shows that professionals in low expenditure states have higher 
actual and desired fertility relative to professionals in high expenditure states. Table 21c 
gives the discrete change in probabilities in the outcome variable based on results 
presented in Model 3 of Table 21a and Table 21b for key independent variables. Discrete 
change is the difference in the predicted value as one independent variable changes 
values from 0 to 1 while all others are held constant at specified values. Table 21c 
suggests a higher discrete change in desired and actual fertility for professionals in low 
expenditure states (0.022 and 0.019) as compared to medium expenditure states (0.008 
and 0.006).  
The results presented here suggest that expenditure on education brings into 
sharper focus the tradeoff between quantity and quality of children and as per our 
theoretical expectations income is not the critical link between expenditure on education 
and fertility outcomes. Even those lower down the income scale (i.e. the non- 
professionals) are likely to have fewer children if they live in states marked by relatively 
high expenditure on education. It seems that the context of high education expenditure 
suffices to motivate even those who have fewer resources (that is, non- professionals) to 
have fewer children presumably to increase their investment on children to improve their 
“quality” in the hope that better education would equip them to access better employment 




Other control variables in our model have the expected sign with the dependent 
variables- i.e., men with higher education have lower fertility levels. Fertility is lowest 
among men residing in metro cities and among Brahmins, other “upper” castes, and other 
religious minorities and men with older wives report the highest fertility levels.  
[Table 21a, Table 21b and Table 21c about here]
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Hierarchical Linear Models  
 Hierarchical linear models presented in Table 22a through Table 24b assess the 
extent to which institutional context of mobility modify the income- fertility relationship. 
We are particularly interested in mobility opportunities presented by the context of 
education and employment opportunities.  
[Table 22a through 24b about here] 
The baseline model (Model 1, not reported here) contains no covariates and 
shows that the percent of variance between couples and groups (villages and rural and 
urban parts of a district in this instance). Results show that around 28 percent of the 
variation in desired fertility and 5 percent of the variation in actual fertility is between 
villages. The remaining 72 percent and 95 percent of the variance for desired and actual 
fertility is between couples respectively.  
Around 23 percent of variance in desired fertility is between rural parts of 
districts. The corresponding percent for actual fertility is 5 percent
6
. The remainder 77 
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education for each of the regression models presented in the text. Even though women’s education has the 
expected negative association with fertility outcomes, the association between income levels and fertility 




percent variance and 95 percent is between individuals respectively for desired and actual 
fertility. Finally, 23 percent of the variance is between urban parts of a district for both 
desired and actual fertility.  
Association between fertility outcomes and level of income taking into account the 
institutional context of employment opportunities  
Model 3 in Table 22 through Table 24 show the association between availability 
of employment opportunities and fertility outcomes. Contrary to our hypothesis, results 
indicate accessibility to employment opportunities have no discernible association with 
fertility outcomes.   
Villages that have access to only agricultural employment do not have higher 
fertility levels as compared to those who have access to all types of employment (Model 
3, Table 22a and Table 22b). The coefficients associated with V_AGR (or villages that 
have access to only agricultural employment) are not statistically significant.  
This is also true for the urban areas within a district. Percent of farmers and 
percent of laborers- the two variables that operationalize availability of employment 
opportunities- are not statistically significant (Model 3, Table 24a and Table 24b).   
With respect to rural areas within a district, we find that higher the percent of 
farmers, higher is the overall actual fertility in the district after controlling for couple 
level variations in fertility outcomes (Model 3, Table 23b) though the associated 
coefficient is not large. Percent of laborers in rural areas of a district does not have a 
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statistically significant relationship with actual fertility. On the other hand, the coefficient 
for percent of farmers and percent of laborers in Model3, Table 23a which deals with 
desired fertility is not statistically significant.   
The absence of a relationship at the village level between the presence of only 
agricultural opportunities within a village and fertility outcomes is in contrast to a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between percent of farmers and actual 
fertility at the district (rural) level. Our contention is that migration outside the village in 
search of employment opportunities reduced the strength of the association between the 
dummy variable (V_AGR) categorizing villages in terms of accessibility to only 
agricultural opportunities and employment opportunities other than agriculture and 
fertility outcomes. There is data to back up this claim. A 2006 study detailing trends on 
internal migration in India by Lusome and Bhagat indicates that it has increased 
substantively during the period 1971- 2001 both in terms of inter and intra district 
migration from rural to urban areas. According to Indian census 2001, there were 309 
million internal migrants based on place of last residence, which makes it roughly 30 
percent of the population and is double in terms of number of internal migrants recorded 
in 1971. Trends for migration between census years indicate that between 1991 and 2001, 
around 32 percent and 36 percent of all men migrated from rural to urban areas and rural 
to rural areas. Intra- district migration accounts for 43 percent of the total migration in a 
district- 23 percent of migration is between rural areas within a district and 10 percent is 
between rural and urban parts of a district. A more recent study (Chandrasekhar, 2011) 
gives us further evidence of the number of workers commuting from their villages to 




commuting from rural to urban areas. Therefore, a variable that captures the extent and 
kind of migration from the village would have probably allowed us to better assess the 
relationship between employment opportunities and fertility outcomes.  
Analysis of explained variance allows us to examine the relative importance of 
alternate set of factors- employment prospects, availability of schooling facilities (only 
for village level models), women’s labor force participation, demographic characteristics 
and infrastructural facilities. The percent reduction in variance over Model 2 (with only 
couple level factors) with the introduction of variable(s) measuring employment in Model 
3 ranges from 1 percent to 90 percent. It is lowest at 1 percent for village level desired 
fertility models (Table 22a) and rather unsurprisingly highest at 90 percent for rural- 
district level actual fertility models (Table 23b) where the employment variables have 
statistically significant coefficients.   
Association between fertility outcomes and level of income taking into account the 
institutional context of private schooling opportunities  
 Model 3A in Table 22a and Table 22b examine if the presence of private schools 
in a village has a negative and statistically significant association with fertility outcomes. 
The results do not validate our hypothesis. Presence of private schools in a village does 
not have a statistically significant association with either desired or actual fertility.  
Once again, many rural students go to private schools outside the village so 
village may not be a useful unit of analysis. Second, while there are now private schools 
even in less prosperous parts of rural India, the “quality” and functioning of these schools 




Moreover, the costs of private schooling range from Rs.15/- per month in less privileged 
areas to Rs.150/- per month in more prosperous areas. Clearly, the burden that a school 
fee of Rs. 15/- places on a couple is different from that placed by Rs. 150/-. It is, 
therefore, possible that a more discernible variable on private schooling within the village 
that captured the fee structure of private schools would have allowed us to capture the 
relationship between presence of schooling opportunities and fertility outcomes. 
Since presence of schooling does not have any significant association with 
fertility outcomes at the village level, it is not surprising that the introduction of a 
variable measuring the availability of schooling opportunities in a village makes no 
contribution in terms of reduction in variance over Model 2.  
Given the ubiquity of schooling opportunities at the district level including private 
schools, we do not have corresponding district level models on its effect on fertility 
outcomes. 
Other control variables in the HLM   
Women’s labor force participation  
  As we had expected women’s employment is negatively and significantly 
associated with fertility outcomes. Across all the models percent of main women workers 
reduce fertility levels. However, in most instances, the coefficients are not large barring 
for urban areas within a district- Model 24a and Model 24b. In these instances, a percent 
increase in women’s labor force participation as main workers reduces overall fertility by 
0.039 and 0.037 log units for desired and actual fertility at the district level after control 




In contrast in all the models there is no statistically significant relationship 
between percent of marginal women workers and fertility outcomes. The explanation for 
this is in the definition of marginal workers, which includes women who have worked 
less than 183 days a year or six months. These women are most likely helping their 
family with their enterprise, whether in farming or non- farming sector through part time 
work (Nayyar. 1987).  
Given the statistically significant relationship between percent of women who are 
main workers and fertility outcomes, it is not the least surprising that there is some 
percent reduction in unexplained variance over Model 2 when variables pertaining to 
women’s labor force participation are introduced in Model 4. The highest percent 
reduction (94%) in Level 2 variance occurs for district level model pertaining to actual 
fertility in urban areas. On the other hand, the lowest percent reduction in Level 2 
variance- a mere 6 percent- is for village level model on desired fertility (Table 22a); 
though labor force participation variables in Model 4 reduce Level 2 variance over Model 
2 sharply by 70 percent in village level models on actual fertility (refer Table 22b). 
Demographic characteristics 
Results of village level hierarchical models (Model 5, Table 22a and Table 22b) 
and district level models for rural areas (Model 5, Table 23a and Table 23b) suggest that 
after controlling for couple level variation in fertility outcomes, there is no statistically 
significant association between percent of population belonging to disenfranchised 
communities- the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes- and fertility outcomes at 




also the case for actual fertility in urban areas of a district. But in contrast to what we had 
expected, the proportion of Scheduled Caste population significantly reduces overall 
desired fertility levels in urban parts of a district (Model 5, Table 24a).  
Percent of literate women significantly reduce overall fertility levels both at the 
district (rural as well as urban areas) and village level after controlling for couple level 
variation in fertility outcomes, but the overall impact is highest in urban parts of a district 
(Model 5, Table 24a and Table 24b).  
Demographic factors reduce unexplained variance at Level 2 over Model 2, which 
is the model that has only couple level variables. The largest reduction in unexplained 
variance (95 percent) is in actual fertility for urban parts of a district (Model 5, Table 
24b), followed closely by actual fertility for rural parts of a district (Model 5, Table 23b). 
The percent reduction is smallest at the village level- 10.5 percent for desired fertility 
(Model 5, Table 22a) and 72 percent for actual fertility (Model 5, Table 22b).  
Infrastructural facilities 
Variables measuring infrastructural amenities in the village and at the district 
level are introduced in Model 6. 
In the village level models, of the three indices that we constructed to take into 
account the different types of infrastructure in a village- infrastructure index, social index 
and program index- only the social index is significantly and negatively associated with 
desired and living number of children at the village level, once couple level variations in 
fertility outcomes have been taken into account. The relevant coefficients are, however, 




The fact that the social index rather than the infrastructure or the program index 
stood out as a variable influencing fertility outcomes requires some explanation. The 
social index composes of items as presence of women’s organization/ trade union/ 
development organization or NGOs/ caste based groups in the village ( refer Table 16 in 
Chapter 3 details). So, while these organizations may not have an explicit goal of 
influencing fertility outcomes, our argument is that their presence in a village is indirectly 
and negatively associated with fertility though the exact pathways may differ. For 
instance, our conjecture is that women’s and development organization by emphasizing 
issues of concern to women and/ or development goals are likely playing an important 
role in reducing overall village fertility levels. Similarly, it can be argued that aside their 
stated organizational objectives caste based networks and trade unions provide a platform 
for people to network and share information, which could be particularly important in the 
context of job search. The role of social networks for the purpose of accessing 
employment opportunities has already been highlighted in previous research- for 
example, Ito (2009) finds that the ratio of village- total workers in regular employment 
(other than the household members) to village- total working age people, a proxy 
measure about information exchange among villagers, significantly decreases the costs of 
finding regular employment. Social networks also play an important role in the migration 
process- social contacts at the destination (whether it is a city, town or another village) 
provide important economic and psychological support to migrants during the initial 
adjustment phase of their stay in their destination (Banerjee, 1983).  The presence of 
absorptive social networks at destination also influences the choice of places to migrate 




In the district level models for rural areas, the average amenities index is inversely 
and statistically significantly related to fertility outcomes, once couple level variation has 
been taken into account (Model 6 in Table 23a and Table 23b). On the other hand, 
percent urban- which we have taken as a proxy measurement for infrastructure in the 
urban parts of a district  does not have any statistically significant relationship with 
desired number of children (Model 6 in Table 24a) but significantly reduces living 
number of children (Model 6 in Table 24b). 
The percent reduction in unexplained Level 2 variance over Model2 when 
measures of infrastructural facilities are introduced in Model 6 is higher for district level 
models (93 percent in Model 6, Table 23b and 90.0 percent in Model 6, Table 24b) as 
compared to village level models (0.03 percent in Model 6 in Table 22a).    
Full model 
The full model or Model 7 includes all the variables mentioned above in order to 
examine potentially confounding effects. Variables measuring availability of employment 
opportunities within an area/ community are not significant in the full model(s). Presence 
of private schooling in the village also does not exhibit the expected significant 
association with fertility outcomes. 
Among the other variables, women’s literacy and participation in the labor force 
as main workers have a statistically significant negative association with overall fertility 
levels in both the models for urban parts of a district. At the village level too, percent of 
literate women and percent of women who are main workers play a key role in 




women’s participation in the labor force could also potentially be fostering an 
institutional environment where it is advantageous to invest in girls’ education.  
While the social index has a significant negative association with village- level 
actual fertility, it is no longer significantly associated with ideal fertility outcomes. 
Instead there is a counterintuitive positive association between the program index and 
living number of children. Overall at the district level, with the exception of urban areas, 
infrastructure facilities remain statistically significant. All the demographic variables 
(percent of Scheduled Caste population, percent of Scheduled Tribe population and 
percent of literate women) are significant when ideal number of children is the dependent 
variable in rural parts of a district.   
Just as one would expect, when all the factors are put together in a single model 
(Model 7) the reduction in unexplained variance at Level 2 is by far the most as 
compared to prior models.   
Conclusion 
 To conclude this chapter, Table 25 summarizes the key results. This is essentially 
a reproduction of Table 17 in Chapter 3 but we have added two new columns for the two 
dependent variables- desired and actual fertility. The table indicates that there is a broad 
support for the hypotheses that we proposed in Chapter 2 except for results using 
hierarchical linear models.  
Other than rural parts of a district, the results from the hierarchical linear models 
do not indicate support for the hypothesis that employment prospects in a community 




private schooling facilities in a village modify the association between fertility outcomes 
and income level. This, however, does not mean that we should conclude that context has 
no role in influencing the association between fertility outcomes and individual income 
levels. As we have suggested in the text, more nuanced measures of schooling 
opportunities and employment prospects at the village/district level, such as an 
employment measure that takes into account migration from a village, could help us 
capture their contextual role. Our argument in favor of better measurements of education 
and employment opportunities as opposed to discarding the hypothesis on the contextual 
role of education is buttressed by the fact that we did find some evidence that 
employment prospects within the rural parts of district affects its overall fertility level. 
And finally, there is support for hypothesis H3a, which asserts that the context of 
educational expenditure modifies the fertility- income hypothesis when we use ordered 
logistic analysis. 
We now proceed to Chapter 5 in which we examine the role of inter- generational 
occupation mobility and fertility outcomes. We already noted in Chapter 2 while there is 
much evidence of inter- generational education mobility in India, inter- generational 
occupation mobility is far limited (Jhilam and Mazumdar, 2011). This suggests that 
occupation in the regression models presented here may be a proxy for inter- generational 
occupational rigidity. It, therefore, remains to be examined to what extent there is an 






Inter- generational Occupation Mobility in India  
 
We began in Chapter 2 with a re- phrasing of Coale’s pre- conditions for 
demographic transition to take place in a country into three necessary and sufficient 
conditions for social mobility to be a factor in a couple’s fertility decisions. In this 
chapter, we re- visit the first condition, viz., mobility must be within the calculus of 
rational choice by focusing on the experience of inter- generational occupational mobility 
and its association with fertility outcomes. A priori, we do not expect a significant 
relationship inter- generational occupation mobility and fertility outcomes since social 
mobility has been relatively low in India with aspirational changes outpacing objective 
achievements (refer Chapter 2) but this remains and empirical question to be explored 
below.  
Limited Application of the Liberal Theory of Social Mobility 
Chapter 2 outlined the “liberal” theory of social mobility which emphasizes a 
“modernist” or “universal” approach to the study of social mobility and its limited 
application in the Indian context. This theoretical framework suggests that there are three 
alternative pathways- structural, processual and compositional- through which a 
traditional society with generally limited chances of social mobility offers greater and 
equitable chances of mobility across all socio- economic sections as it transitions to a 
modern society (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2008). To recall further from Chapter 2, 
structural changes refer to technology used in industrial societies that renders redundant 




technology in modern societies which necessitates high rates of mobility both across 
generations and within one’s lifetimes. Processual changes refer to the shift in emphasis 
from ascribed status (such as lineage or kinship) in traditional societies to achieved status 
(such as level of education and skill set) in modern societies as a critical factor in social 
mobility. Finally, compositional changes refer to economic expansion in modern societies 
that are typically associated with the growth of the secondary and tertiary sector and a 
shift away from the agricultural sector. While kinship networks play an important role in 
agriculture, greater emphasis is placed on specialized skills and educational achievements 
in the industrial and services sector.  
However, contrary to what is predicted by the theory, there is no clear evidence 
that modernity in India is associated with increasing social mobility across all 
dimensions, but most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation we find that there is 
very limited inter- generational occupation mobility. Furthermore, the liberal theory of 
social mobility receives only limited support for countries in the western hemisphere as 
well. Evidence from Europe and Northern America does not support the argument that 
social structure in the developed world is completely amenable to social mobility (Boyd, 
1973). Recent literature in economics on income mobility in the US and other countries 
suggests that the coefficient for inter- generational income elasticity is significantly 
different from zero, with zero indicating perfect mobility (Solon, 2002, 1999, 1992). A 
number of intervening factors mediate the process of social mobility (Ganzeboom, 
Treiman and Ultee, 1991); even claims of similar mobility patterns across industrial 
nations (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959) is not supported by empirical evidence. See also 




countries- USA and Canada, and two Scandinavian countries- Norway and Sweden and 
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) for a comparative study of Sweden, England 
and France. More importantly, just as in India, the chances of inter-generational mobility 
are also likely to vary for people of different social backgrounds. For example, in the US, 
Hertz (2006) suggests that the rate of upward income mobility is far lower for Black than 
White families. While only 10 percent of the Whites born in the lowest deciles remain 
there as adults, the comparable figure for Blacks is 42 percent.  
Alternative Theories on Social Mobility  
Since there is no clear evidence in support of the liberal theory of mobility, 
alternative theoretical frameworks attempt to explain social mobility in the Western 
world. Lipset and Zetterberg (1956, 1959), for example, argue that among industrial 
nations there is no apparent association between rates of economic growth and social 
mobility. Rather, according to them, once societies cross a threshold level of 
industrialization absolute rates of mobility in these societies become higher than in their 
pre- industrial state.  
Yet another radical departure from the liberal view is provided by Sorokin (1959). 
He rejected the “structural” view of mobility; instead he offered what can be termed as 
the “cyclical” view of mobility. He argues that while it is true that Western countries did 
witness higher rates of social mobility with modernization, it is by no means 
“unprecedented” or “eternal”. Rather he argues that what the Western world witnessed is 
specific to historical period- societies in certain historical phases have witnessed an 




forms of barriers to mobility such as those based on religion have been largely dismantled 
in Western societies, other forms of barriers such as those based on educational systems 
and occupational qualifications have either emerged or become stronger.  
A relatively recent formulation, Featherman, Jones and Hauser (1975), provides 
an even more comprehensive challenge to the claims of liberal theorists on mobility. 
They argue that mobility rates across countries can scarcely be expected to be similar 
because they are determined by such structural factors as economic, technological and 
demographic forces. However, when mobility is measured at the individual level net of 
the structural factors, industrial societies do display similar rates of mobility. The 
emphasis on relative as distinct from absolute rates of mobility suggests a reformulation 
of Lipset and Zetterberg’s hypothesis- when mobility is considered at “phenotypical” 
level of absolute rates of mobility; mobility rates are not similar across nations. However, 
once “genotypical” level of mobility - that is the mobility rates of individuals after 
discounting exogenous factors as the structure of the economy, occupational structure and 
demographics- is taken into account, mobility rates across developed nations can be 
expected to be similar. As far as absolute rate of mobility across countries is concerned, 
Featherman, Jones and Hauser concur with Sorokin that mobility regimes tend to 
stabilize once nations are “deemed” industrialized and thereafter, there is no particular 
affinity to even greater openness or equal opportunities for individuals across all sections 





 Inter- generational Occupation Mobility in India 
It remains to be seen if these alternative theories could help explain inter- 
generational occupation mobility or rather its stickiness in the India. An application of 
Featherman, Jones and Hauser (1979) theoretical formulation would suggest that 
structural changes in the economy could account for some of inter- generational 
occupational mobility in the country. Net of these structural changes, mobility rates of 
individuals from different caste backgrounds ought to be similar if the hypothesis of 
diminishing role of caste in occupational mobility were to hold true.  
Though still primarily an agricultural economy, the major structural change 
associated with the Indian economy since independence (1947) is a contraction of the 
agricultural sector and a corresponding expansion of the industrial/ manufacturing sector 
and services sector. In terms of the composition of the Gross Domestic Product, 
agriculture accounted for 38.1 percent of the Indian economy in 1980, its share went 
down to 19.6 percent in 2005. The share of the manufacturing sector remained fairly 
constant during this time period at 17.7 percent in 1980 to around 15.1 percent in 2005. 
The share of the services sector, on the other hand, increased by more than 20 percentage 
points from 44 percent in 1980 to 65 percent in 2005 (Reserve Bank of India, 2008; 
Panagriya, 2008: 283). This structural change in the economy would necessarily be 
associated with a reduction in the number of people employed in agriculture and an 
increase in the numbers employed in industrial/ manufacturing sectors and the services 
sector. Table 26 below gives the distribution of occupation profile of men in different 
census years and suggests a far limited change in terms of occupational distribution 




[Table 26 about here] 
Table 26 indicates that while there is a steady reduction in the proportion of men 
reporting themselves as cultivators, there has been a concomitant increase in proportion 
reporting themselves as agricultural laborers. Nevertheless, there has been a very slow 
drop in the proportion employed in the agricultural sector- the combined share of 
cultivators and agricultural laborers was at 61 percent in 1991 as compared to 67 percent 
in 1951. This decline in agricultural employment is not necessarily matched by a 
corresponding increase in the share of the manufacturing and services sector but 
particularly noteworthy is the steady decline in the household manufacturing sub- sector 
between 1961 and 1991 from 6 to 2 percent (we do not consider here the figures for 1951 
since it combines household and non- household manufacturing).  While fertility studies 
in India have typically suggested that farm households’ labor demands lead to demands 
for child labor and consequent higher fertility (Khuda, 1991, Shariff, 1991, Nadkarni, 
1976), given the generally small size of farms in India (Chandra, 2011, Rosenzweig and 
Evenson, 1977) and high rates of underemployment for adults (Mahendra Dev and 
Venkatanarayana, 2011), we do not expect to see this factor playing an important role in 
fertility of Indian families. However, if this transition involves movement into higher 
skill occupations, it may lead to higher investment on quality and lower investment on 
child quantity. 
Simple cross tabulations using 1971 and 1991 National Election Study data (NES) 
collected by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)
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terms of inter- generational occupational mobility these structural changes translate into 
outmigration from the agricultural sector into other sectors of employment (Kumar et al., 
2002b). However, the increase is not uniform across different sectors of the economy, 
rather unsurprisingly a large proportion of the outmigration is into manual labor (skilled, 
semi- skilled and unskilled labor, but excluding those in the agricultural sector)- people 
whose fathers were agriculturalists (defined as owner and tenant cultivators, dairy and 
poultry farmers, laborers and landless laborers, sharecroppers, fishermen and shepherds) 
accounted for   34.2 percent and 39.5 percent of the salaried class in 1971 and 1996 
respectively, 20.0 percent and 28.3 percent of the business class in 1971 and 1996 
respectively and 19.7 percent and 32.0 percent of the manual labor class in 1971 and 
1996 respectively.  
The next step in the analysis is to study inter- generational mobility by caste, net 
of the structural changes. Over time trends indicate some weakening of traditional caste- 
occupation linkages even though overall “upper” castes are most likely to be in more 
privileged occupations, that is, salaried jobs and business and least likely to be working 
as manual labor (Desai and Dubey, 2011, Kapur et al., 2010). The Scheduled Tribes are 
most likely to be engaged in farming while those belonging to Scheduled Castes are most 
likely to be engaged in manual labor. Muslims (the second largest religious group) in 
India are most likely to be concentrated in business and are likely to be relatively less in 
the agricultural sector. In 1971, the chances of men from upper castes reaching the 
salaried income group were four times higher than the disenfranchised castes. Compared 
                                                                                                                                                                             
researchers to study inter- generational occupation mobility (Kumar et al, 2002a and 2002b). When allied 
with data on caste and community, we are able to study inter- generation occupation mobility patterns 





to 1971, all caste groups except Muslims improved their chances of moving into the 
salaried income group in 1996. Correspondingly, they (all caste groups) also had lower 
chances of ending up as agriculturalists.  
Regression analysis indicates that these trends hold after discounting changes in 
the structure of the Indian economy. Fewer people from OBC (Other Backward Castes) 
community were in the manual category and correspondingly more were agriculturalists 
in 1996 than would be expected if the OBC- manual labor/ agriculturalist link remained 
the same as in 1971. Kumar et al. (2002b) conclude that this indicates that land 
distribution program carried out in the 1950s yielded some benefits. For Scheduled 
Castes, the likelihood of being in the salaried class is higher in 1996 than if the linkage 
between Scheduled Caste and salaried observed in 1971 were maintained. To some 
extent, this points to the efficacy of reservation policies under which certain percent of 
government jobs are “reserved” for marginalized castes. However, there is no 
corresponding evidence of improved chances for Scheduled Tribes, another intended 
beneficiary of reservation policies (Kumar et al., 2002b).  
Data  
 In the previous paragraphs, we see that in spite of some evidence of mobility, 
occupations are fairly sticky across generations in India. We now proceed to examine if 
occupation in the regression model in Chapter 4 indeed proxies for lack of inter- 
generational occupational mobility. 
While longitudinal data is most appropriate for a study of inter- generational 




that this helps to maintain continuity with the analysis presented in Chapter 4, it should 
also be noted that there are no available panel data on India that collects information on 
occupations. Additionally, IHDS allows us to study the association between fertility 
outcomes and inter- generational occupation mobility, which is not possible with other 
data sets like the census or NSSO, which have information pertaining to inter- 
generational occupation mobility but not pertaining to fertility outcomes.   
Sample 
The analysis presented below is restricted to a smaller sample 29, 114 couples. As 
before the analytical sample consists of married men who are above 18 years but less 
than 59 years whose wives were interviewed in the survey. We dropped households in 
which the head of the household was not clearly marked and/ or female headed 
households which recorded the occupation of the head of household’s husband and not 
the father.   
Table 27 illustrates the loss in terms of sample size with the above restrictions.  
[Table 27 about here] 
Table 28 presents descriptive statistics analogous to the one presented in Table 8 
for two groups of men- men in the previous study sample (N= 31, 419) and men in the 
new study sample (N= 29, 114). The table shows in terms of key characteristic variables 
the two samples are similar.  





Key independent variable 
The analysis proceeds in the same manner as outlined in Chapter 3- we use 
ordinal logistic regression models, the same dependent and control variables. The only 
difference is that we have a new measure of father’s occupation, which is essential to 
measure occupation mobility. Question 1.19 on page 3 of the household questionnaire in 
IHDS asks  
“What was the occupation of the household head’s father (or husband) for most of 
his life?”  
In Chapter 3, we have already given details on how men’s occupation is measured 
in the survey. We code father’s occupation in the same manner. But we also further 
collapse men’s and their father’s occupation into two categories- professionals and non- 
professionals- for analytical ease. Farmers and laborers are placed in the category of non- 
professionals while businessmen and professionals are placed in the category of 
professionals. The reasoning behind this classification is that businessmen are closer to 
professionals than to farmers and laborers in terms of their fertility behavior; while the 
latter two display similar fertility behavior (Bhuyan, 1996).  
Regression Model 
We use ordinal logit regressions as outlined in Chapter 3. Model 1 has only the 
log of personal income as the independent variable. Model 2 introduces three control 
variables- caste, rural/ urban residence and wife’s age. Model 3 has men’s years of 
education along with the other variables in Model 2. Model 4 and Model 5 introduce 




interaction between father’s and men’s occupation. The interaction term measures the 
association of inter- generational occupation mobility with fertility outcomes. While we 
expect the size of the income coefficient to decrease with the addition of each new 
variable into the respective models in keeping with the overarching theme of this 
dissertation, our key hypothesis in this chapter is that because inter-generational 
occupation mobility is pretty restrictive in the presence of a variable measuring inter- 
generational occupational mobility (Model 6) men’s occupation will have no statistical 
association with fertility outcomes.  
[Table 29 about here] 
Association between fertility outcomes and inter- generational occupation mobility 
 Data from IHDS (2005) confirms that while majority of the population in all caste 
groups are non- professionals, the proportion is lowest for caste groups at the upper end 
of the caste hierarchy, viz. Brahmins and other “upper” castes and other religious groups 
as Sikhs and Jains. Muslims too have a relatively low proportion of population as non- 
professionals. Disenfranchised population groups are most likely to be non- 
professionals- 90 percent among Scheduled Tribes and 89 percent among Scheduled 
Castes.    
Table 30 presents simple cross tabulation of men and their father’s occupation- 
not surprisingly, majority of men who are non- professionals (that is, farmers, laborers or 
“others”) had fathers who were also non- professionals. Of the men who are 
professionals, 77 percent had fathers who are non-professionals while 25 percent have 




take into consideration the structural changes in the economy is consistent with previous 
analysis by Kumar et al. (2002a and 2002b) and Jhilam and Mazumdar (2011) of some 
inter- generational mobility in terms of upward inter- generational occupational mobility 
of a transition from non- professionals (father’s occupation) to professionals (men’s 
current occupation). We find that a comparatively higher percent of men from OBC 
(84.31 percent), Scheduled Caste (87.27 percent) and Scheduled Tribes (88.43 percent) 
are professionals while their fathers were non- professionals. The corresponding percent 
for Brahmins and other “upper” castes are 59.45 percent and 68.87 percent respectively. 
The results of the regression models are presented in Table 31a and Table 31b for 
ideal and living number of children respectively. In accordance with the main hypothesis 
of this dissertation, we find that the size of the income coefficient progressively 
diminishes with the addition of each new variable into the model. Additionally, for 
desired number of children, the income coefficient is not significant in Model 4 through 
Model 6.  
More pertinently, for the purposes of this chapter we find that men’s occupation is 
not significant for both desired and living number of children in Model 4 through Model 
6.  But men whose fathers were professionals have lower desired (β= -0.099 in Model 5) 
and actual fertility (β= -0.230 in Model 5) than men whose fathers were non- 
professionals. The interaction variable in Model 6 is not significant for either desired or 
actual fertility- men who are professionals and whose fathers were also professionals do 
not have significantly lower fertility outcomes than those who are non- professionals and 
whose fathers are also non- professionals. For desired fertility, men’s occupation and 




while men’s occupation is not significant, father’s occupation is significant for actual 
fertility (β= -0.270 in Model 6).   
[Table 31a and Table 31b about here] 
Other variables in the model behave in predicted manners. Brahmins have the 
lowest desired and actual fertility among all caste/ religious groups with the exception 
that there is no statistically significant difference with the other “upper” castes and 
Sikh/Jain and Christians have the lower fertility levels. Muslims report the highest 
fertility levels. Women in oldest age groups have as expected highest ideal and living 
number of children. Fertility is lower in rural areas as compared urban areas and metro 
cities. 
Conclusion 
 The results in this chapter are in accordance with the first pre- condition for 
mobility to be a factor in fertility decisions- viz. that it must be within the calculus of 
rational choice. Lower fertility seems to be particularly concentrated among men who 
have a long term professional background (men whose fathers’ were also professionals). 
The results, particularly of Model 5 in Table 31a and Table 31b, indicate that men whose 
fathers are professionals have lower fertility outcomes than men whose fathers are not 
professionals. In other words, it is not couples who are currently experiencing mobility 
but those who have been in professional occupations for at least two generations who are 
most likely to have lower fertility- thus, it would seem that mobility is more “real” for 




New professionals whose fathers’ were not professionals, on the other hand, have not yet 








In concluding the dissertation, we re- visit the hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2 
and assess to what extent our hypotheses were supported by empirical evidence in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In order to recapitulate, the three hypotheses stated in Chapter 2 
are the following: 
H1: In absence of controls, income is negatively associated with fertility. 
H2: The relationship between income and fertility is at least partly due to the link 
between income and mobility and hence, the income coefficient will decline with the 
addition of factors associated with mobility such as education and occupational status.  
H3: The relationship between income and fertility will be weaker in areas where:  
a. greater investment is required in the form of educational expenditure to 
ensure mobility. 
b. mobility potential is greater. 
In outlining the regression results in Chapter 4, we found conclusive evidence 
supporting the first and second hypotheses (H1 and H2). On the other hand, support for 
hypotheses H3a and H3b is at best weak (see Table 25). While not diluting the emphasis 
in Chapter 4 for better measurements of mobility opportunities so as to accurately 
understand the association between mobility aspirations and experience and fertility 
outcomes, we argue here the results also suggest that child bearing decisions of couples 




being solely motivated with the desire to access mobility opportunities (Table 21a 
through Table 24b in Chapter 4) or their own mobility experience (Table 31a and Table 
31b in Chapter 5).  
The argument here is similar to what Desai and Alva (1998) assert in the context 
of an association between maternal education and child health. Their contention is that a 
causal association between child health outcomes and level of mother’s education is far 
weaker than what is presumed in the literature. While it is indeed the case that educated 
mothers are most likely to seek health services for their children, this association is 
largely overridden by the availability of health services in which they reside. Likewise we 
suggest that the association between overall higher levels of women’s education, their 
participation in the labor force and availability of infrastructural amenities and fertility 
outcomes at the level of the community can also be viewed in terms of the process of 
westernization and social mobility (Hypothesis H3b). The overall context in a community 
in terms of percent of women who are literate, women’s participation in the labor force 
and availability of infrastructure facilities through various linkages as identified in 
Chapter 3 are instrumental in setting the stage for norms around fertility levels. We 
indicated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 that one of the strategies for social mobility in India 
is adoption of secular practices associated with westernization. To the extent that 
women’s education and their participation in the labor force relate to the process of 
westernization, it can be expected that these couples set the norms for fertility behavior in 
their community which is subsequently widely adopted by other couples irrespective of 
their income levels. Similarly, to the extent the availability of infrastructure helps in 




weaken the linkages between fertility outcomes and levels of income. Thus, couples who 
reside in communities where a high percent of women are literate, women’s labor force 
participation is high and better infrastructural facilities are more likely to follow the 
norms of overall lower fertility levels even when their own education level may not be 
high or their participation in the labor force is limited or they are lower down the income 
scale vis-à-vis couples with similar socio- economic background but residing in 
communities where the overall levels of women’s education, women’s participation in 
labor force and infrastructural facilities are poorer. Hence, we find that at the level of the 
community the association between fertility outcomes and income levels is weakened not 
so much by access to mobility opportunities but the cultural context of fertility norms as 
defined by women’s literacy and labor force participation rate and the context of 
development as defined by infrastructural facilities.  
Finally, following the same lines of reasoning, the extent to which lower fertility 
levels in high education expenditure states among the high income groups is associated 
with investment in quality of children to access better social mobility opportunities, it 
helps in diffusing the ideal of a small family; thereby weakening the links between 
fertility outcomes and income levels (Hypothesis H3a).  
In drawing linkages between the community norm of a small family and a 
weakened association between fertility levels and levels of income, we also build on 
recent attempts in the literature by Desai and Andrist (2010: 681) to highlight the 
“synergies between new sociology of culture and demographic research”. Using the 
framework of culture and action wherein culture provides a repository of “toolkits” which 




daily lives (Swidler, 1984: 273), Desai and Andrist (2010) posit early marriage in India as 
part of a gender script that emphasize modesty, chastity and segregation. Families by 
marrying their daughters off early “do gender” so as to conform to the prevalent gender 
norms in their communities while at the same time by practicing gauna or the custom by 
which cohabitation is delayed till the young bride and groom come of age, they are able 
to ensure education for their daughters, which is an essential marker of status in modern 
India. See also Andrist, Banerji and Desai (forthcoming) for similar exposition on how 
the sociology of culture helps understand decisions and practices around marriage in 
India.  
In the last concluding paragraph, we would like to highlight that our findings 
suggest that the prospect of mobility is “real” for only a small section of the population, 
who take it into consideration as a relevant factor in fertility outcomes/ decisions. In our 
view, the policy recommendations that stem from our analysis is to expand the chances of 
educational and employment opportunities so as to ensure that even those at the bottom 
of the socio- economic hierarchy are motivated to invest in their children. The best means 
to achieve a broadening of educational and economic opportunities remain an open 
question though. India already has the world’s largest affirmative action program in the 
form of subsidies and scholarships and reservations in educational institutions and 
government jobs (Kumar, 1992). Should policymakers further expand the scope of these 
policies to ensure equitable mobility opportunities? Can the expansion of these policies 
be achieved without further disrupting the social fabric of the country? In 1992 when the 
then Prime Minister of the country sought to expand the scope of affirmative policies, it 




concerned that such an expansion of affirmative policies would lead to widespread 
joblessness among their ranks; self- immolated themselves as a means of protest against 
these policies. It is, however, also possible that greater economic growth as well as 
greater recognition about the need to undo the historical inequities perpetrated against 
marginalized castes since then may lead to a greater acceptance of these policies. For 
instance, in a recent paper studying the efficacy of reservation policies for “lower caste” 
groups in engineering colleges in India, Bertrand, Hanna and Mullainathan (2008) find 
that while the most popular argument against affirmative action, viz., that it benefits the 
richer segments among marginalized communities does not hold much ground, there is 
also no evidence that the marginal “upper caste” applicant who loses his/her admission in 
an engineering college to a “lower caste” aspirant ends up with a more negative attitude 
either towards the “lower caste” or for affirmative action policies. Or should policy 
makers focus on strategies beyond affirmative action policies? These could include 
measures to improve chances of mobility such as via providing better quality teaching 
through government schools and building roads/ provide communications so that people 
can better access employment opportunities? Or should as Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2009) argue a greater focus be placed on improving the functions of the markets such 
that the role of caste networks in accessing employment opportunities diminish in the 
future allowing for greater inter- generational occupational mobility? But then can the 
market be trusted to level the playing field and not reinforce traditional social inequities?  
Admittedly, each of these policy options has its own sets of advantages and challenges 
and raises its own set of questions. A comprehensive review of these options is essential 




overcome the stickiness of occupations across generations and enhance mobility for all 






Table 1:  Differentials in total fertility rates by background characteristics in various 
NFHS rounds. 
     
 
NFHS- I NFHS-II NFHS-III 
 Total 3.39 2.85 2.68 
 Residence 
    Rural 3.67 3.07 2.98 
 Urban 2.70 2.27 2.06 
 Education 
    Illiterate 4.03 3.47 3.55 No education 
Literate < middle  
school complete 3.01 2.64 2.45 < 5 years education 
Middle school 
complete 2.49 2.26 2.51 5- 7 years education 
High school and  
above 2.15 1.99 2.23 8- 9 years education 
 
n/a n/a 2.08 10- 11 years education 
 
n/a n/a 1.80 
12 or more years  
education 
Religion 
    Hindu 3.30 2.78 2.59 
 Muslim 4.41 3.59 3.40 
 Christian 2.87 2.44 2.34 
 Sikh 2.43 2.26 1.95 
 Jain n/a 1.90 1.54 
 Buddhist/ Neo-  
Buddhist n/a 2.13 2.25 
 No religion n/a 3.91 n/a 
 Other 2.77 2.33 3.98 
 Social groups 
    Scheduled Tribe 3.55 3.15 2.92 
 Scheduled Caste 3.92 3.06 3.12 
 Other Backward 
Caste n/a 2.83 2.75 
 Other 3.30 2.66 2.35 
 Don’t know n/a n/a 1.98 
 Standard of Living 
    Low n/a 3.37 3.89 Lowest 
Medium n/a 2.85 3.17 Second 
High n/a 2.10 2.58 Middle 
 
n/a n/a 2.24 Fourth 
 





Table 2:  Differentials in total fertility rates by states in various NFHS rounds 
     
 
NFHS- I NFHS-II NFHS-III 
 India 3.39 2.85 2.70 
      
Delhi 3.02 2.40 2.10 
 Haryana 3.99 2.88 2.70 
 Himachal 
Pradesh 2.97 2.14 1.90 
 Jammu &  
Kashmir 3.13 2.71 2.40 
 Punjab 2.92 2.21 2.00 
 Rajasthan 3.63 3.78 3.20 
 
     Uttaranchal n/a n/a 2.50 
 Chattisgarh n/a n/a 2.60 
 Madhya Pradesh 3.90 3.31 3.10 
 Uttar Pradesh 4.82 3.99 3.80 
 
     Jharkhand n/a n/a 3.30 
 Bihar 4.00 3.49 4.00 
 Orissa 2.92 2.46 2.40 
 West Bengal 2.92 2.29 2.30 
 
     Arunachal Pradesh 4.25 2.52 3.00 
 Assam 3.53 2.31 2.40 
 Manipur 2.76 3.04 2.80 
 Meghalaya 3.73 4.57 3.80 
 Mizoram 2.30 2.89 2.90 
 Nagaland 3.26 3.77 3.70 
 Tripura 2.67 n/a 2.20 
 Sikkim n/a 2.75 2.00 
 
     Goa 1.90 1.77 1.80 
 Gujarat 2.99 2.72 2.40 
 Maharashtra 2.86 2.52 2.10 
 
     Andhra Pradesh 2.59 2.25 1.80 
 Karnataka 2.85 2.13 2.10 
 Kerala 2.00 1.96 1.90 





Table 3: Discontinuation rates for men and women by educational level 
          










1 & 5 
(age 12+) 
5 & 10  
(age 17+) 
10 & 12 
(age 19+) 





1 & 5 
(age 
12+) 
5 & 10  
(age 17+) 





           
All India 20 15 50 43 44 40 16 57 45 44 
  
    
  
    
  
Age 
    
  
    
  
7- 9 7 
   
  11 
   
  
10- 14 6 23 
  
  10 22 
  
  
15- 19 10 9 51 46   19 9 53 42   
20- 29 14 9 48 38 49 33 11 52 39 46 
30- 39 22 12 48 40 45 49 17 66 54 40 
40- 59 30 18 53 50 39 61 22 66 54 40 
60+ 46 29 59 55 39 80 39 75 57 37 
  
    
  
    
  
Place of  
Residence 
    
  
    
  
Metro 7 6 34 38 30 18 9 43 39 37 
Other urban 11 9 40 36 25 25 10 46 38 39 
More 
developed 
villages 21 15 53 50 42 42 18 62 52 55 
Less 
developed 
villages 25 20 61 48 49 49 24 73 57 60 
  
    
  







    
  
    
  
Lowest  
Quintile 29 24 65 50 57 52 26 73 56 58 
2nd Quintile 27 22 68 54 63 49 23 73 55 71 
3rd Quintile 23 17 63 53 61 43 20 69 60 58 
4th Quintile 17 13 52 52 53 36 15 61 50 50 
Top Quintile 7 6 30 33 35 22 8 41 37 39 
  
    
  




    
  
    
  
High caste  
Hindu 8 8 37 36 39 25 11 48 40 40 
OBC 18 15 52 47 47 41 16 61 50 46 
Dalit 26 19 61 51 53 48 21 66 47 55 
Adivasi 31 23 65 43 54 54 25 69 48 49 
Muslim 26 21 59 45 47 43 23 66 51 54 
Other religion 8 6 34 45 41 14 8 42 40 45 
 





Table 4: Schooling experiences of children aged 6- 14 
 
        






























All India 10 5 85 20 6 28 20 481 606 178 1265 
            Sex 
           Male 9 5 87 20 6 29 22 521 625 199 1344 
Female 12 5 83 19 6 26 19 436 584 155 1175 
            Current 
Standard 
           1- 5 
   
21 5 28 18 427 514 127 1068 
6- 10 
   
16 9 26 26 636 855 300 1791 
            Place of 
Residence 
           Metro 5 4 91 5 6 44 33 1564 991 506 3060 
Other urban 6 5 89 13 5 52 30 1052 923 329 2303 
More 
developed 
villages 9 5 87 18 6 24 19 318 609 137 1065 
Less 
developed 
villages 14 6 81 26 6 17 15 187 395 92 674 
            Income 
           Lowest 
Quintile 14 6 79 24 6 15 15 162 374 78 614 




3rd Quintile 10 6 84 21 6 22 19 295 502 128 925 
4th Quintile 9 5 87 18 6 33 22 505 676 190 1370 
Top Quintile 4 2 94 11 4 52 31 
    
            Social 
Groups 
           High caste 
Hindu 3 3 94 15 5 40 27 904 924 346 2174 
OBC 9 4 87 21 5 26 20 398 543 149 1090 
Dalit 12 5 83 22 8 17 18 271 471 134 876 
Adivasi 16 7 77 19 9 15 9 203 392 73 669 
Muslim 17 8 76 21 5 33 19 428 521 130 1079 
Other 
religion 2 2 96 4 4 54 27 1446 1370 224 3040 
            Maximum 
Household 
Education 
           None 23 7 70 25 6 15 14 152 367 70 589 
1- 4 Std 11 8 81 22 9 13 19 132 379 95 607 
5- 9 Std 7 5 88 21 7 22 19 288 498 126 912 
10- 11 Std 4 2 94 15 4 39 24 662 773 228 1663 
12 Std/ 
Some 
college 3 3 95 17 5 45 25 806 876 282 1964 
Graduate/ 
Diploma 2 1 97 11 3 58 34 1620 1219 500 3339 
            Source: Table A6.3a in Desai et al. (2010) 




Table 5: Expected direction and strength of income coefficient with fertility outcomes 






Hypothesis II  
(in presence of education and  
occupation controls) 
Hypothesis III  
(in presence of control for 
institutional  
context of education and 
employment opportunities) 
Direction -ve -ve -ve 




Table 6: Comparison of IHDS with other national surveys on selected variables. 










Urban 26 31 25 28 
     Per cent  
literate 
    Age 5+ 67 67 66 NA 
Age 7+ 68 69 67 65 
     Caste 
    Other Backward  
castes 42 40 41 NA 
Scheduled castes 21 19 20 16 
Scheduled tribes 7 8 9 8 
Other 30 32 31 NA 
     Religion 
    Hindu 80 82 82 81 
Muslim 14 13 13 13 
Christian 2 3 2 2 
Sikh 2 2 2 2 
Buddhist 1 1 1 1 
Jain 1 1 1 1 
Others 2 1 1 1 
     Per cent currently 
in 
school (age 5- 14) 80 NA 83 NA 
Knowledge of 
AIDS  
(women) 54 61 NA NA 
Work participation 
rate for 
males 53 NA 55 52 
Work participation 
rate for 
females 32 NA 29 26 
Average family size 5 5 5 5 
Number of children 
ever born 
to women (40- 4) 4 4 NA NA 
Number of children 
ever born 




Per cent women 
married  
(age 15- 49) 73 75 76 77 
Per cent women 
married  
(all ages) 48 47 48 48 
Per cent electricity 72 68 65 56 
Per cent piped 
water 40 25 41 37 
TV ownership 
(color or b/w) 48 
25 
(color) 37 24 
LPG use 33 25 22 18 
Per cent flush 
toilets 23 NA 19 18 










Total number of men in the 
sample who are between 18- 59 
years 68, 487 
Restriction I (Number dropped 
from the analytical sample 
because they were not married.) 24, 934 
 
Restriction II (Number dropped 
because there was no 
corresponding ever married 
women in the  
household survey) 12, 134 
 






Table 8: Comparative descriptive statistics of various alternative samples 
 
     
 
Study sample 
(N= 31, 419) 
Men in age range, 
with no 
corresponding  
ever married women 
in the household 
survey  
(N= 12, 134) 
Women in the 
analytical 
sample 
(N= 31, 419) 
Women in 
reproductive  
ages (15- 49 years)  
who are not part  
of the  
analytical sample 
(N= 16, 311) 
 
Urban 29.65 23.29 29.65 33.31 
     Per cent  
literate 74.70 73.23 52.59 78.24 
Age 5+ N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Age 7+ N/A N/A N/A N/A 
     Caste 
    Brahmins 4.97 5.58 4.97 5.11 
Other 
Backward 
Castes 40.74 42.23 40.74 40.58 
Scheduled  
Castes 22.17 20.05 22.17 21.98 
Scheduled  
Tribes 7.65 8.26 7.65 7.8 
Others 24.47 23.87 24.47 24.53 
Religion 
    Hindu 82.29 84.36 82.29 81.55 
Muslim 11.65 10.59 11.65 12.01 
Christian 2.40 1.72 2.40 2.81 
Sikh 1.42 1.73 1.42 1.37 
Buddhist 0.78 0.35 0.78 0.84 
Jain 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.31 
Others 1.16 0.90 1.16 1.11 
     Work  
participation  
rate  94.33 88.80 52.65 33.17 
Average  
family size 5.62 7.92 5.62 5.32 
Per cent  






Per cent  




b/w) 51.09 54.37 51.09 49.45 
LPG use 24.80 24.66 24.80 24.94 
Per cent  
flush toilets 22.48 22.89 22.48 23.11 
Per cent 





Table 9: NFHS- 3 percentage estimates of currently married men and women age 15-
49 who want no more children by number of living children, according to wealth 
index.  
 
         
  
Number of living 
children 
    Wealth Index 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ Total 
   
Men 
     Lowest 3.4 15.6 68.2 84.1 92.4 94.2 94.6 68.0 
Second 3.3 18.4 78.9 89.2 94.3 93.6 96.6 70.5 
Middle 4.8 22.2 83.1 91.9 93.2 96.9 94.7 70.2 
Fourth 3.6 28.9 87.0 92.4 96.3 92.3 98.0 71.9 
Highest 5.8 38.5 91.1 95.2 96.2 95.8 98.1 72.1 
 
                Women 
    Lowest 3.0 16.2 65.1 82.0 88.5 89.6 88.8 65.0 
Second 2.4 18.9 78.3 87.4 90.3 91.1 89.3 68.2 
Middle 2.0 23.3 82.8 92.6 92.9 94.3 89.0 71.0 
Fourth 2.8 28.1 86.8 93.6 94.0 92.3 92.1 72.8 




Table 10: NFHS- 3 percentage estimates of currently married men and women age 15-49 
who want no more children by number of living children, according to education 
background 
         
  
Number of living children 
    Years of  
education 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ Total 
   
Men 
     No education 6.9 22.8 74.8 87.6 91.5 93.4 95.1 73.6 
< 5 years  
complete 4.1 20.6 81.6 91.5 95 95.2 96.7 73.4 
5- 7 years complete 3.7 18.2 82.8 92.4 94.6 95 97.1 69 
8- 9 years complete 2.5 21.9 81.7 89.4 94.5 96.1 94.8 66.5 
10- 11 years 
complete 6.5 33.5 88.7 91.4 98.2 94.6 95.1 72.5 
12+ years complete 2.7 36.9 90.4 93.7 96.9 93.4 99.7 69.2 
   
Women 
     No education 3.8 21.2 73.3 87.1 90.5 91 89 72.6 
< 5 years  
complete 3.6 28.5 85.9 93.5 91.8 95.2 91.5 74.3 
5- 7 years complete 2.5 23.6 84.7 93.2 94.9 93.8 89.1 69.7 
8- 9 years complete 1.7 25.9 87.1 94.1 95.4 94.3 96.5 66.8 
10- 11 years 
complete 1.6 33.5 90.4 95 96.2 94.4 87.6 68.8 






Table 11: Categorization of Indian states by expenditure on private tuition, IHDS 
(2005) 
   
Category 
Average 






High 3000 and above 
Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, 
Punjab, North- East (excluding Assam), 
Kerala 
Medium 2001- 2999 
 Uttarakhand, Gujarat, Assam, Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka,Tamil Nadu, Delhi,  
West Bengal   
Low 2000 and below 
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan 
Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, 
Orissa,  






Table 12: NFHS estimates of total fertility rates by caste/ religion groups 









   Hindus 3.3 2.78 2.59 
Muslims 4.41 3.59 3.4 
Christians 2.87 2.44 2.34 
Sikh 2.43 2.26 1.95 
Jain n/a 1.9 1.54 
Buddhist/ 
Neo- Buddhist n/a 2.14 2.25 
Other 2.77 2.33 3.98 
No religion n/a 3.91 2.92 
    Caste 
   SC 3.92 3.15 2.92 
ST 3.55 3.06 3.12 
OBC n/a 2.83 2.75 
Other 3.3 2.66 2.35 






Table 13: Models examining the association between Fertility Outcomes and Level of Income, controlling for men's years 
of education and occupation. 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Dependent variable: Ideal number of children/ Current number of children 
 
    
Log of income 
(-) 
Log of income 
(Less negative than Model 
1) 
Log of income 
(Less negative than Model 2) 
Log of income 
(Less negative than Model 
3) 
  
Men's education Men's education 
   





(Reference caste: Brahmins) 
Caste groups 
(Reference caste: Brahmins) 
Caste groups 
(Reference caste: Brahmins) 
 
Wife's age 
(Reference age: 18- 23 
years) 
Wife's age 
(Reference age: 18- 23 years) 
Wife's age 




(Reference area: Rural 
areas) 
Current residence 
(Reference area: Rural areas) 
Current residence 





Table 14: Models examining the Association between fertility outcomes and income level controlling for expenditure on education 
    Dependent variable: Ideal number of children/ Current number of children 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Log of income 
(-) 
Log of income 
(Less negative than Model 1) 
Log of income 
(Less negative than Model 2) 
 Men's education Men's education Men's education 
 Occupation group 
(Reference occupation: Professionals  
and businessmen)  
Occupation group 
(Reference occupation: Professionals  
and businessmen)  
Occupation group 
(Reference occupation: Professionals  
and businessmen)  
 
 
State residence categorized in terms of 
expenditure on education  
(Reference state: High expenditure 
state) 
State residence categorized in terms of 
expenditure on education 
(Reference state: High expenditure state) 
 
  
 Men's occupation* State residence 
categorized in terms of  
expenditure on tuitions 
 Caste groups 
(Reference caste: Brahmins) 
Caste groups 
(Reference caste: Brahmins) 
Caste groups 
(Reference caste: Brahmins) 
 Wife's age 
(Reference age: 18- 23 years) 
Wife's age 
(Reference age: 18- 23 years) 
Wife's age 
(Reference age: 18- 23 years) 
 Current residence 
(Reference area: Rural areas) 
Current residence 
(Reference area: Rural areas) 
Current residence 






Table 15: Hierarchical Linear Models examining the association between perceived chances of mobility and fertility levels 
Dependent variable: Ideal number of children/ Current number of children 
Variables 
Hypothesized 









Level 1  
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Table 16: Itemized breakdown of infrastructure index, social index and program index. 
    
 
Infrastructure 




Access to paved roads 
Mahila mandal (women's 
organization) in the village 
Access to PDS 
2 
Access to electricity 
Youth clubs, sports group 
or reading group in the village 
Access to food work 
3 
Access to landline phone 
in the village 
Trade union, professional 
group in the village 
Access to SGRY 
4 
Access to mobile telephone 
service 
SHGs in the village 
Access to other govt.  
Employment program 
5 
Access to bus stop 
Religious or Social/ festive 
group 
Access to other women's  
welfare program 
6 
Access to police station Caste association 
Access to Non- formal  
education program 
7 
Access to bazaar Development group or NGO 
Access to skill development 
program 
8 
Access to kirana store 
Agricultural or Milk  
cooperative 
Access to National Old Age  
Pension scheme 
9 
Access to bank Panchayat bhawan 
Access to Widow's Pension  
scheme 
10 
Access to post office Pani panchayat 








Community TV set Access to Annapurna scheme 
13   
Access to Safe Drinking 
Water scheme 
14   
Access to sanitation 
program 
15   




Access to imporved stoves 
17   




Access to forestry programs 
19   
Access to small loans, micro- 
credit, etc programs 
20   
Access to ICDS program 
for immunization 
21   





22   
Access to ICDS food/ meals 
program 
23   




Access to ICDS early 
childhood/ pre- school 
education program 
25   










Table 17: Discussion summary in terms of research hypothesis, dependent, independent and control variables 
 
Dependent variable: Fertility outcomes- Desired and Actual fertility 
 
   




variable Control variables 
 
H1  
Negative association between income 
and fertility outcomes, in the absence of 
controls 
Ordinal  
logit Income level None 
 
H2 
Weaker negative association between  
income and fertility outcomes in the  




Men's education  
level Income level 
 
   
Men's occupation Caste groups 
 
    
Wife's age 
 




Further weaker negative association  
between income and fertility outcomes 





categorized in terms 
of expenditure on 
education Caste groups 
 
    
Wife's age 
 
    
Current residence 
 












Further weaker negative association  
between income and fertility outcomes 
in presence of educational and 
employment opportunities. 
Hierarchical 
linear model Income level 
Men's education  
level Level 1 
variables 
    
Men's occupation 
    
Caste groups 
    
Wife's age 
    
Current residence 
   
Presence of private 
school in the village 
(village) 




   
Percent of farmers/ 
Percent of laborers 
(district)/ Dummy for 
villages with access 
to only agricultural 
employment (village) 
Per cent of marginal 
workers 
    
Per cent of SC  
population 
    
Per cent of ST 
population 
    
Per cent of literate 
women 
    
Infrastructure index,  
Social index, Program 
index (Village)/ 
Amenities index (Dist. 
rural)/ 







Table 18: Mean ideal number of children and number of children by income quintiles, 
IHDS (2005) 
   
 
Average number  
of  
ideal children 
Average number  
of  
living children 
Income <0 2.51 2.59 
Lowest Quintile 2.55 2.51 
2nd Quintile 2.54 2.54 
3rd Quintlie 2.49 2.51 
4th Quintile 2.37 2.42 






Table 19a: Association between ideal number of children and level of income, controlling 
for men's years of education, occupation and other background characteristics. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Log of personal income -0.292*** -0.122*** -0.0439*** -0.0127 
 
(0.012) (0.0132) (0.0140) (0.0149) 




   
(0.00297) (0.00319) 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Professionals) 
    Business 
   
0.236*** 
    
(0.0673) 
Farmers 
   
0.400*** 
    
(0.0717) 
Laborers 
   
0.302*** 
    
(0.0683) 
Others 
   
0.169*** 
    
(0.0645) 
Caste (Reference group: Brahmins) 
    Other Upper Caste 
 
0.0755 -0.0372 -0.0623 
  
(0.0670) (0.0673) (0.0674) 
Other Backward Castes 
 
0.534*** 0.362*** 0.356*** 
  
(0.0627) (0.0635) (0.0636) 
Scheduled Castes 
 
0.621*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 
  
(0.0649) (0.0664) (0.0670) 
Scheduled Tribes 
 
0.852*** 0.608*** 0.610*** 
  
(0.0737) (0.0751) (0.0756) 
Muslim 
 
1.486*** 1.229*** 1.233*** 
  
(0.0696) (0.0711) (0.0712) 
Sikh, Jain 
 
-0.158 -0.278* -0.322** 
  
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) 
Christian 
 
-0.319** -0.391*** -0.391*** 
  
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Wife's age  
(Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
    24- 29 years 
 
0.326*** 0.308*** 0.310*** 
  




30- 34 years 
 
0.737*** 0.690*** 0.695*** 
  
(0.0438) (0.0440) (0.0440) 
35 years and above 
 
1.039*** 0.967*** 0.972*** 
  
(0.0392) (0.0395) (0.0396) 
Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 
    Urban areas 
 
-0.729*** -0.673*** -0.626*** 
  
(0.0339) (0.0341) (0.0353) 
Metro cities  
 
-1.219*** -1.204*** -1.162*** 
  
(0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0462) 
Number of  
observations 26330 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 19b: Association between living number of children and level of income, 
controlling for men's years of education and occupation and other background 
characteristics. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     Log of personal income -0.139*** -0.120*** -0.0325*** -0.007 
 
(0.0101) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0133) 




   
(0.00267) (0.00286) 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Professionals) 
    Business 
   
0.418*** 
    
(0.0565) 
Farmers 
   
0.489*** 
    
(0.0612) 
Laborers 
   
0.305*** 
    
(0.0578) 
Others 
   
0.253*** 
    
(0.0537) 
Caste (Reference group: Brahmins) 
    Other Upper Caste 
 
0.0868 -0.0346 -0.0628 
  
(0.0563) (0.0565) (0.0567) 
OBC 
 
0.470*** 0.290*** 0.288*** 
  
(0.0531) (0.0537) (0.0539) 
SC 
 
0.734*** 0.472*** 0.495*** 
  
(0.0552) (0.0565) (0.0571) 
ST 
 
0.539*** 0.276*** 0.305*** 
  
(0.0649) (0.0661) (0.0665) 
Muslim 
 
1.348*** 1.067*** 1.063*** 
  
(0.0605) (0.0617) (0.0619) 
Sikh, Jain 
 
-0.0753 -0.199* -0.250** 
  
(0.113) (0.113) (0.114) 
Christian 
 
-0.548*** -0.641*** -0.627*** 
  





Wife's age  
(Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
    24- 29 years 
 
1.869*** 1.865*** 1.868*** 
  
(0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0401) 
30- 34 years 
 
2.749*** 2.727*** 2.733*** 
  
(0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0425) 
35 years and above 
 
3.438*** 3.393*** 3.400*** 
  
(0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0401) 
Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 
    Urban areas 
 
-0.403*** -0.342*** -0.313*** 
  
(0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0305) 
Metro cities  
 
-0.680*** -0.667*** -0.635*** 
  
(0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0376) 
Number of  
observations 27636 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 20: Average number of ideal children and number of living children by states  





number of  
ideal children 




states 2.36 2.35 
Medium expenditure  
states 2.18 2.25 
Low expenditure 






Table 21a: Association between desired number of children and income level in the 
context of expenditure on education 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    Log of personal income -0.0401*** 0.00405 0.00435 
 
(0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Men's years of education -0.0516*** -0.0603*** -0.0604*** 
 
(0.00302) (0.00307) (0.00307) 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
   Professionals  -0.0680** -0.144*** 0.0437 
 
(0.0337) (0.0341) (0.104) 
Expenditure on tuitions (Reference group: 
High expenditure states) 
   














   
(0.117) 




   
(0.111) 
Caste (Reference group: Brahmins) 
   Other Upper Caste -0.0277 0.108 0.107 
 
(0.0670) (0.0675) (0.0676) 
Other Backward Castes 0.368*** 0.456*** 0.456*** 
 
(0.0632) (0.0637) (0.0637) 
Scheduled Castes 0.377*** 0.572*** 0.573*** 
 
(0.0662) (0.0668) (0.0669) 
Scheduled Tribes 0.619*** 0.625*** 0.621*** 
 
(0.0748) (0.0755) (0.0756) 
Muslim 1.240*** 1.375*** 1.378*** 
 
(0.0708) (0.0715) (0.0716) 
Sikh, Jain -0.267* -0.0248 -0.0225 
 
(0.142) (0.147) (0.147) 
Christian -0.388*** 0.131 0.139 
 




Women's age (Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
   24- 29 years 0.296*** 0.306*** 0.307*** 
 
(0.0429) (0.0433) (0.0433) 
30- 34 years 0.678*** 0.716*** 0.715*** 
 
(0.0438) (0.0443) (0.0443) 
35 years and above 0.957*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 
 
(0.0394) (0.0398) (0.0398) 
Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 
   Urban areas -0.669*** -0.570*** -0.570*** 
 
(0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0347) 
Metro cities  -1.202*** -0.883*** -0.884*** 
 
(0.0454) (0.0474) (0.0474) 
Number of  
observations 26, 451 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 21b: Association between living number of children and income level in the  
context of expenditure on education 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Log of personal income -0.0305** 0.00142 0.00155 
 
 
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0127) 
 
Men's years of education -0.0580*** -0.0626*** -0.0625*** 
 
 
(0.00271) (0.00273) (0.00273) 
 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
    
Professionals  0.0129 -0.0285 -0.103 
 
 
(0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0822) 
 
Expenditure on tuitions 
(Reference group:  
High expenditure states) 












 Interaction term 1 





   
(0.0930) 
 Interaction term 2 





   
(0.0900) 
 Caste (Reference group: 
Brahmins) 
    Other Upper Caste -0.0424 0.0241 0.0247 
 
 
(0.0563) (0.0564) (0.0564) 
 Other Backward Castes 0.282*** 0.328*** 0.328*** 
 
 
(0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0536) 
 Scheduled Castes 0.464*** 0.569*** 0.566*** 
 
 
(0.0564) (0.0566) (0.0566) 
 Scheduled Tribes 0.277*** 0.278*** 0.283*** 
 
 
(0.0659) (0.0662) (0.0662) 
 Muslim 1.058*** 1.124*** 1.123*** 
 
 





Sikh, Jain -0.208* -0.0428 -0.0462 
 
 
(0.113) (0.116) (0.116) 
 Christian -0.651*** -0.348*** -0.353*** 
 
 
(0.101) (0.103) (0.103) 
 Women's age  
(Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
    24- 29 years 1.869*** 1.902*** 1.902*** 
 
 
(0.0400) (0.0403) (0.0403) 
 30- 34 years 2.732*** 2.782*** 2.785*** 
 
 
(0.0424) (0.0427) (0.0427) 
 35 years and above 3.400*** 3.466*** 3.468*** 
 
 
(0.0400) (0.0404) (0.0404) 
 Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 
    Urban areas -0.346*** -0.295*** -0.297*** 
 
 
(0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
 Metro cities  -0.665*** -0.496*** -0.496*** 
 
 
(0.0367) (0.0383) (0.0383) 
 Number of  
observations 27,764 
   






Table 21c: Discrete change in probabilities for outcome variables for selected 
characteristics in Model 3, Table 21a and Table 21b at Mean 
   
 
Desired Fertility Actual Fertility 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
  Professionals  0.004 0.0101 
   Expenditure on tuitions (Reference 
group:  
High expenditure states) 
  Medium expenditure states 0.018 0.002 
   Low expenditure states 0.091 0.059 
   Interaction term 1 (Professionals * 
Medium expenditure state) 0.008 0.006 
   
Interaction term 2 (Professionals * Low 






        Table 22a: Coefficients from village level hierarchical linear models; dependent variable- 
desired fertility 
  
        
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 3A Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Level 1 variables 
       Intercept 2.58** 2.58** 2.57** 2.57** 2.55** 2.57** 2.55** 
Log of income -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0006 
Men's years of  
education -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.017** -0.018** -0.017** 
Occupations 
(Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
       
Professionals  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
Caste (Reference 
group: Brahmins) 
       OBC 0.046 0.048 0.046 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.058 
SC 0.158** 0.158** 0.157** 0.161** 0.159** 0.163** 0.164** 
ST 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 0.229** 0.229** 0.233** 0.237** 
Other upper caste  
Hindus 0.227** 0.266** 0.263** 0.27005** 0.271** 0.262** 0.276** 
Muslim 0.462** 0.462** 0.462** 0.451** 0.464** 0.468** 0.456** 
Christian -0.054 -0.059 -0.054 -0.053 -0.037 -0.035** -0.025 
Other -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.063 0.019 0.082 
Wife's age  
(Reference group: 18- 
23 years) 
       24- 29 years 0.129** 0.129** 0.129** 0.131** 0.132** 0.131** 0.133** 
30- 34 years 0.276** 0.278** 0.276** 0.278** 0.282** 0.278** 0.283** 




        Level 2 variables 
       Village level 
employment 
prospects 




Villages with access to 
employment 




    
-0.08 
Schooling facilities in the village 
      
Presence of private 
school in the village 
  
-0.017 
   
-0.0003 
Women's labor force 
participation indicators 
       Per cent of women main 
workers 




Per cent of women 
marginal workers 





       
Per cent of SC 
population 




Per cent of ST 
population 




Per cent of literate 
women 




Village level socio- 
economic development 
indices 
       Infrastructure index 






     
-0.025** -0.013 
Program index 
     
0.015 0.012** 
        Level 2 variance 0.181 0.180 0.181 0.171 0.162 0.176 0.150 
Level 1 variance 0.462 0.462 0.462 0.462 0.462 0.462 0.462 
        Reduction in Level 2 
variance  
(over Model 2) 
 
0.01 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.17 
        * p <= 0.05, **p <= 0.01 





Table 22b: Coefficients from village level hierarchical linear models; dependent variable- living number of 
children 
 
        
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 3A Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Level 1 variables 
       Intercept 2.58** 2.57** 2.57** 2.56** 2.55** 2.57** 2.55** 
Log of income 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.0102 0.005 0.008 
Men's years of  
education -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.018** -0.019** -0.018** 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
       Professionals  -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 
Caste (Reference group: 
Brahmins) 
       OBC 0.047 0.05 0.045 0.055 0.0601 0.059 0.073 
SC 0.225 0.226** 0.225** 0.229** 0.227** 0.234** 0.234** 
ST 0.270** 0.270** 0.269** 0.275** 0.269** 0.277** 0.275** 
Other upper caste  
Hindus 0.143* 0.144** 0.145* 0.149* 0.14001 0.153* 0.141** 
Muslim 0.439** 0.438** 0.438** 0.428** 0.444** 0.446** 0.439** 
Christian -0.115 -0.117 -0.116 -0.104 -0.077 -0.1103 -0.079 
Other -0.261* -0.257* -0.262 -0.252* -0.1502 -0.242* -0.139 
Wife's age  
(Reference group: 18- 23 years) 
       24- 29 years 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 
30- 34 years 1.52** 1.51** 1.51** 1.52** 1.53** 1.52** 1.53** 
35 years and above 1.87** 1.86** 1.87** 1.87** 1.88** 1.87** 1.88** 




Level 2 variables 
       Village level employment 
prospects 
       
Villages with access to only 
agricultural employment  
 
-0.02 
    
-0.032 
Schooling facilities  
in the village 




   
0.066 
Women's labor force 
participation indicators 
       
Per cent of women main workers 




Per cent of women marginal 
workers 





       
Per cent of SC population 




Per cent of ST population 




Per cent of literate women 




Village level socio- economic 
development indices 
       Infrastructure index 
     
0.011 0.016 
Social index 
     
-0.028** -0.019** 
Program index 
     
0.008 0.005 
        Level 2 variance 0.319 0.102 0.102 0.097 0.088 0.097 0.082 
Level 1 variance 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 
        Reduction in Level 2 variance  
(over Model 2) 
 
0.68 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.74 
* p <= 0.05, **p <= 0.01 





Table 23a: Coefficients from district- level hierarchical linear models (rural), dependent variable- 
desired number of children 
       
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Level 1 variables 
      
Intercept 2.57** 2.57** 2.56** 2.54** 2.55** 2.53** 
Log of income -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
Men's years of  




      
Professionals  0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 
Caste (Reference group: 
Brahmins) 
      
OBC 0.079 0.079 0.085 0.083 0.086 0.085 
SC 0.168** 0.169** 0.172** 0.173** 0.172** 0.173** 
ST 0.2301** 0.231** 0.234** 0.237** 0.234** 0.237** 
Other upper caste  
Hindus 0.297** 0.296** 0.299** 0.306** 0.294** 0.308** 
Muslim 0.512** 0.514** 0.512** 0.513** 0.516** 0.511** 
Christian 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.041** 0.035** 0.044 





Wife's age  
(Reference group: 18- 23 
years) 
      24- 29 years 0.123** 0.123** 0.123** 0.124** 0.123** 0.124** 
30- 34 years 0.272** 0.273** 0.273** 0.275** 0.275** 0.275** 
35 years and above 0.399** 0.40002** 0.401** 0.402** 0.402** 0.403** 
       Level 2 variables 
      Employment opportunities 
      
Per cent of farmers 
 
0.006 
   
0.0006 
Per cent of laborers 
 
0.004 
   
0.002 
Women's labor force 
participation indicators 













      
Per cent of SC population 




Per cent of ST population 




Per cent of literate women 





      Average amenities indes 
    
-0.064** -0.054** 
       Level 2 variance 0.162 0.157 0.136 0.119 0.117 0.10009 
Level 1 variance 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.497 
Reduction in Level 2 
variance (over Model 2) 
 
0.68 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.80 
* p <= 0.05, **p <= 0.01 





Table 23b: Coefficients from district- level hierarchical linear models (rural), dependent variable- living 
number of children 
       
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Level 1 variables 
      Intercept 2.59** 2.601** 2.59** 2.56** 2.57** 2.55** 
Log of income 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.013 
Men's years of  




      
Professionals  -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.0003 
Caste (Reference group: 
Brahmins) 
      OBC 0.089 0.091 0.099 0.109 0.104 0.114 
SC 0.242** 0.245** 0.249** 0.257** 0.247** 0.257** 
ST 0.308** 0.31002** 0.315** 0.3204** 0.314** 0.32003** 
Other upper caste  
Hindus 0.214** 0.208** 0.217** 0.242** 0.198** 0.243** 
Muslim 0.504** 0.509** 0.501** 0.518** 0.507** 0.5104** 
Christian -0.141 -0.137 -0.128 -0.108 -0.098 -0.094 
Other 0.062 0.101 0.063 0.154 0.177 0.201 
Wife's age  
(Reference group: 18- 23 
years) 
      24- 29 years 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 
30- 34 years 1.51** 1.52** 1.51** 1.52** 1.52** 1.52** 
35 years and above 1.87** 1.87** 1.87** 1.87** 1.87** 1.87** 




Level 2 variables 
      Employment opportunities 
      Per cent of farmers 
 
0.007** 
   
0.002 
Per cent of laborers 
 
0.0003 
   
-0.0006 
Women's labor force 
participation indicators 
      













      
Per cent of SC population 




Per cent of ST population 




Per cent of literate women 





      
Average amenities indes 
    
-0.062** -0.046** 
       Level 2 variance 0.092 0.084 0.077 0.059 0.056 0.049 
Level 1 variance 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 
       Reduction in Level 2 
variance (over Model 2) 
 
0.90 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.94 
       * p <= 0.05, **p <= 0.01 




Table 24a: Coefficients from district- level hierarchical linear models (urban), dependent variable- desired number of children 
       
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Level 1 variables 
      Intercept 2.57** 2.57** 2.54** 2.56** 2.57** 2.55** 
Log of income -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
Men's years of  
education -0.02004** -0.02006** -0.02008** -0.019** -0.02003** -0.019** 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
      
Professionals  0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 
Caste (Reference group: Brahmins) 
      OBC 0.079 0.08002 0.083 0.086 0.0805 0.085 
SC 0.168** 0.169** 0.173** 0.177** 0.169** 0.176** 
ST 0.2301** 0.2305** 0.235** 0.239** 0.231** 0.239** 
Other upper caste  
Hindus 0.297** 0.297** 0.303** 0.304** 0.297** 0.303** 
Muslim 0.512** 0.512** 0.513** 0.514** 0.513** 0.513** 
Christian 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.042 0.029 0.037 
Other 0.131 0.133 0.155 0.188 0.138 0.185 
Wife's age  
(Reference group: 18- 23 years) 
      24- 29 years 0.123** 0.123** 0.123** 0.123** 0.123** 0.123** 
30- 34 years 0.272** 0.272** 0.273** 0.274** 0.272** 0.274** 
35 years and above 0.399** 0.399** 0.4007** 0.402** 0.399** 0.402** 




Level 2 variables 
      
Employment opportunities 
      
Per cent of farmers 
 
0.0103 
   
0.004 
Per cent of laborers 
 
-0.005 
   
0.007 
Women's labor force participation 
indicators 
      











      
Per cent of SC population 




Per cent of ST population 




Per cent of literate women 





       
Per cent 
urban 
    
-0.455 -0.102 
       Level 2 variance 0.162 0.162 0.113 0.101 0.157 0.094 
Level 1 variance 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.497 
       Reduction in Level 2 variance (over 
Model 2) 
 
0.67 0.77 0.80 0.68 0.81 
       * p <= 0.05, **p <= 0.01 




Table 24b: Coefficients from district- level hierarchical linear models (urban), dependent variable- living number of 
children 
 
       
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Level 1 variables 
      
Intercept 2.59** 2.61** 2.57** 2.57** 2.59** 2.57** 
Log of income 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.0101 
Men's years of  
education -0.020006** -0.0201** -0.02002** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** 
Occupations (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
      Professionals  -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.0008 
Caste (Reference group: Brahmins) 
      OBC 0.089 0.0905 0.095 0.112 0.092 0.1102 
SC 0.242** 0.246** 0.249** 0.259** 0.242** 0.261** 
ST 0.307** 0.311** 0.316** 0.324** 0.310** 0.324** 
Other upper caste  
Hindus 0.215** 0.212** 0.219** 0.237** 0.214** 0.232** 
Muslim 0.504** 0.505** 0.501** 0.515** 0.507** 0.512** 
Christian -0.141 -0.139 -0.129 -0.102 -0.129 -0.114 
Other 0.062 0.065 0.077 0.196 0.076 0.189 
Women's age  
(Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
      24- 29 years 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 1.05** 
30- 34 years 1.51** 1.51** 1.51** 1.52** 1.51** 1.52** 
35 years and above 1.86** 1.86** 1.86** 1.87** 1.86** 1.87** 




Level 2 variables 
      Employment opportunities 
      
Per cent of farmers 
 
0.02 
   
-0.004 
Per cent of laborers 
 
-0.019 
   
-0.016 
Women's labor force participation 
indicators 
      












      
Per cent of SC population 




Per cent of ST population 




Per cent of literate women 





      Per cent 
urban 
    
-0.514* -0.136 
       Level 2 variance 0.092 0.087 0.055 0.046 0.087 0.04 
Level 1 variance 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 
       Reduction in Level 2 variance  
(over Model 2) 
 
0.90 0.94 0.95 0.90 0.95 
       * p <= 0.05, **p <= 0.01 






Table 25: Summary of research hypothesis and empirical results 
 
   











Negative association between 
income and fertility outcomes, 
in the absence of controls 
Ordinal  
logit Income level Support Support 
H2 
Weaker negative association 
between income and fertility 
outcomes in the  




Men's education  
level Support Support 
   
Men's occupation Support Support 
H3a 
Further weaker negative 
association between income 
and fertility outcomes 




State residence categorized 
in terms of expenditure on 
education Support Support 
H3b 
Further weaker negative 
association between income 
and fertility outcomes 




Percent of farmers/ Percent 
of laborers (district)/ 
Dummy for villages with 
access to only agricultural 
employment (village) Not supported 
Support only for  
district-level 
rural models 
   
Presence of private school 
in the village 





Table 26: Distribution of occupation profile of men, 1951- 1991 
  
      
 
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 
Cultivation 54 51 46 44 40 
Agricultural labour 13 13 12 20 21 
Livestock, forestry, fishing, hunting and 
plantations, 
orchards and allied activities - 3 2 2 2 
Mining and quarrying - - 1 1 1 
Manufacturing, processing,  
servicing and repairs in household industry 12 6 3 3 2 
Manufacturing, processing, servicing and 
repairs in non-household industries - 6 7 9 9 
Construction - 1 1 2 2 
Trade and commerce 6 5 6 7 9 
Transport, storage and communications 2 2 3 3 4 
Other services 13 12 9 9 11 
      Source: Census of India, various years. 









Total number of men in the sample 
who are between 18- 59 years 68, 487 
Restriction I (Number dropped 
from the analytical sample because 
they were not married.) 24, 934 
Restriction II (Number dropped 
because there was no 
corresponding ever married 
women in the  
household survey) 12, 134 
Restriction III (Number dropped 
because we do not have 
information about the head of the 
household's father) 2, 305 






Table 28: Comparative descriptive statistics of two alternative samples 
   
 
Previous  sample 
(N= 30, 431) 
New sample 
(N= 29, 114) 
Urban 29.64 30.05 
   Per cent  
literate 74.71 70.70 
Age 5+ N/A N/A 
Age 7+ N/A N/A 
   Caste 
  Brahmins 4.95 4.66 
Other Backward Castes 40.74 40.72 
Scheduled Castes 22.18 22.42 
Scheduled Tribes 7.66 8.27 
Others 24.46 23.93 
   Religion 
  Hindu 82.29 82.30 
Muslim 11.65 11.70 
Christian 2.40 2.50 
Sikh 1.42 1.30 
Buddhist 0.78 0.80 
Jain 0.30 0.30 
Others 1.16 1.10 
   Work participation rate  94.33 94.60 
Average family size 5.62 5.30 
Per cent electricity 72.32 71.50 
Per cent piped water 40.98 40.70 
TV ownership (color or 
b/w) 51.07 49.20 
LPG use 24.79 36.60 
Per cent flush toilets 22.48 22.30 





Table 29: Models examining the association between fertility outcomes and level of income, controlling for men's years of 
education and inter- generational occupation mobility 
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
      Dependent variable: Ideal number of children/ Current 
number of children 
   
      
Log of income 
(-) 
Log of income 
(--) 
Log of income 
(--) 
Log of income 
(--) 
Log of income 
(--) 
Log of income 
(--) 
  
Men's education Men's education Men's education Men's education 







Men's Occupation group  
(Reference occupation: 
Professionals) 




























18- 23 years) 
Wife's age 
(Reference age: 




Interaction term: Men's 


























    
Current residence 
(Reference area: Rural 
areas) 
Wife's age 
(Reference age: 18- 23 
years) 
     
Current residence 







Table 30: Inter- generational mobility across occupations 




Non- professionals Professionals 
Men's  
occupations Non- professionals 95.52 4.48 
 






Table 31a: Association between desired number of children and income level taking into account inter- generational 
occupation mobility 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       Log of personal income -0.277*** -0.102*** -0.0253* -0.0218 -0.0214 -0.0213 
 
(0.0120) (0.0137) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Men's years of education 
  
-0.0524*** -0.0514*** -0.0509*** -0.0509*** 
   
(0.00321) (0.00327) (0.00328) (0.00328) 
Men's Occupation (Reference 
group:  
Non- Professionals) 
      Professionals  
   
-0.0567 -0.0433 -0.0487 
    
(0.0364) (0.0371) (0.0396) 
Father's Occupation (Reference 
group:  
Non- Professionals) 
      Professionals  
    
-0.0999* -0.123 
     
(0.0555) (0.0809) 
Interaction term 
(Men's Occupation * Father's 
Occupation) 
     
0.0433 
      
(0.109) 
Caste (Reference group: 
Brahmins) 
      Other Upper Caste 
 
0.103 -0.00465 -0.00832 -0.0155 -0.0149 
  
(0.0741) (0.0745) (0.0745) (0.0746) (0.0746) 
Other Backward Castes 
 
0.577*** 0.415*** 0.410*** 0.398*** 0.399*** 
  
(0.0694) (0.0702) (0.0703) (0.0705) (0.0706) 
Scheduled Castes 
 





(0.0715) (0.0730) (0.0732) (0.0734) (0.0735) 
Scheduled Tribes 
 
0.850*** 0.628*** 0.621*** 0.610*** 0.610*** 
  
(0.0804) (0.0817) (0.0818) (0.0820) (0.0821) 
Muslim 
 
1.534*** 1.293*** 1.292*** 1.283*** 1.284*** 
  
(0.0762) (0.0777) (0.0777) (0.0778) (0.0779) 
Sikh, Jain 
 
-0.134 -0.242 -0.244 -0.245 -0.246 
  
(0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) 
Christian 
 
-0.319** -0.377*** -0.386*** -0.393*** -0.392*** 
  
(0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) 
Women's age (Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
      24- 29 years 
 
0.316*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.334*** 0.335*** 
  
(0.0473) (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0475) 
30- 34 years 
 
0.677*** 0.686*** 0.687*** 0.689*** 0.689*** 
  
(0.0476) (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0478) (0.0478) 
35 years and above 
 
0.983*** 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.985*** 0.985*** 
  
(0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0426) 
Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 
      Urban areas 
 
-0.721*** -0.655*** -0.652*** -0.646*** -0.646*** 
  
(0.0361) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0365) 
Metro cities  
 
-1.221*** -1.187*** -1.188*** -1.184*** -1.184*** 
  
(0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) 
Number of  
observations 23,022 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







Table 31b: Association between living number of children and income level taking into account inter- generational occupation 
mobility 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       Log of personal income -0.148*** -0.117*** -0.0448*** -0.0460*** -0.0446*** -0.0444*** 
 
(0.011) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) 
Men's years of education 
  
-0.0474*** -0.0477*** -0.0465*** -0.0464*** 
   
(0.00288) (0.00293) (0.00294) (0.00294) 
Men's Occupation (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
      Professionals  
   
0.0190 0.0504 0.0404 
    
(0.0319) (0.0326) (0.0349) 
Father's Occupation (Reference group:  
Non- Professionals) 
      Professionals  
    
-0.230*** -0.270*** 
     
(0.0470) (0.0682) 
Interaction term 
(Men's Occupation * Father's Occupation) 
     
0.0734 
      
(0.0919) 
Caste (Reference group: Brahmins) 
      Other Upper Caste 
 
0.0707 -0.0279 -0.0268 -0.0435 -0.0427 
  
(0.0619) (0.0621) (0.0622) (0.0622) (0.0622) 
Other Backward Castes 
 
0.480*** 0.335*** 0.337*** 0.310*** 0.311*** 
  
(0.0583) (0.0589) (0.0590) (0.0592) (0.0593) 
Scheduled Castes 
 
0.717*** 0.508*** 0.510*** 0.482*** 0.483*** 
  
(0.0605) (0.0617) (0.0618) (0.0621) (0.0621) 
Scheduled Tribes 
 
0.516*** 0.313*** 0.315*** 0.290*** 0.291*** 
  






1.389*** 1.164*** 1.165*** 1.144*** 1.146*** 
  
(0.0659) (0.0671) (0.0672) (0.0673) (0.0673) 
Sikh, Jain 
 
0.0338 -0.0618 -0.0615 -0.0624 -0.0649 
  
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) 
Christian 
 
-0.433*** -0.500*** -0.496*** -0.510*** -0.507*** 
  
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
Women's age (Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
      24- 29 years 
 
1.962*** 1.991*** 1.991*** 1.992*** 1.993*** 
  
(0.0444) (0.0445) (0.0445) (0.0446) (0.0446) 
30- 34 years 
 
2.771*** 2.801*** 2.800*** 2.806*** 2.807*** 
  
(0.0463) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) 
35 years and above 
 
3.470*** 3.493*** 3.492*** 3.497*** 3.497*** 
  
(0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.0436) 
Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 
      Urban areas 
 
-0.371*** -0.310*** -0.311*** -0.297*** -0.297*** 
  
(0.0313) (0.0315) (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0317) 
Metro cities  
 
-0.665*** -0.635*** -0.635*** -0.626*** -0.626*** 
  
(0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0392) (0.0392) 
Number of  
observations 24249 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table I: State- wise distribution of the IHDS sample 
         
  






areas Blocks Villages Rural Urban  Total Rural Urban  Total 
Jammu & Kashmir 14 5 5 21 20 400 315 715 2528 1702 4230 
Himachal Pradesh 12 9 7 21 52 1057 315 1372 5663 1503 7166 
Punjab 17 13 11 36 61 1033 560 1593 6202 2831 9033 
Chandigrah 1 1 1 6 0 0 90 90 0 383 383 
Uttaranchal 13 6 3 9 20 309 149 458 1757 736 2493 
Haryana 19 14 6 18 79 1350 268 1618 8112 1291 9403 
Delhi 9 10 7 56 6 60 900 960 329 4291 4620 
Rajasthan 32 23 17 60 88 1590 895 2485 9663 4805 14468 
Uttar Pradesh 70 43 24 75 138 2389 1123 3512 14966 6499 21465 
Bihar 37 17 10 31 61 965 465 1430 5950 2856 8806 
Sikkim 4 1 1 3 3 60 45 105 293 212 505 
Arunachal Pradesh 13 1 1 3 6 120 45 165 623 209 832 
Nagaland 8 4 1 2 5 100 30 130 480 84 564 
Manipur 9 3 1 3 3 60 45 105 359 239 598 
Mizoram 8 1 1 3 3 60 45 105 263 239 502 
Tripura 4 2 1 3 7 184 45 229 818 190 1008 
Meghalaya 7 3 1 3 6 116 45 161 505 250 755 
Assam 23 8 7 21 38 699 318 1017 3286 1404 4690 
West Bengal 18 14 21 75 66 1247 1133 2380 6170 4788 10958 
Jharkhand 18 6 9 27 26 519 405 924 2913 2095 5008 
Orissa 30 26 13 40 84 1464 600 2064 7710 2886 10596 
Chattisgarh 16 15 6 18 49 905 270 1175 4833 1377 6210 
Madhya Pradesh 45 31 13 42 121 2177 628 2805 12392 3409 15801 
Gujarat 25 17 14 60 70 1167 911 2078 5926 4234 10160 




Dadra and Nagar  
Haveli 1 1 0 0 3 60 0 60 315 0 315 
Maharashtra 35 27 18 75 115 2078 1125 3203 10881 5721 16602 
Andhra Pradesh 23 19 18 60 94 1526 909 2435 6669 3992 10661 
Karnataka 27 26 21 78 144 2832 1189 4021 14184 5675 19859 
Goa 2 2 1 3 6 100 65 165 475 307 782 
Lakshadweep 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kerala 14 12 14 42 61 1089 642 1731 4892 3089 7981 
Tamil Nadu 30 21 22 74 62 898 1200 2098 3691 4855 8546 
Pondicherry 4 1 1 3 3 60 45 105 245 228 473 
Andaman and 
 Nicobar 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 593 384 276 971 1503 26734 14820 41554 143374 72380 215754 
            Source: Table A1.1 in Desai et al. (2010) 





Table II: Occupation Codes as used in Census of India, 2001 
  
     
Division  
Occ Code  
(2 digit) Description 
Occupation  
Category Occupation Type 
Professional, Techinical 
and Related Workers 
Division 0-1 
    
 
0 Physical Scientists 1 Upper Professional 
 
1 Physical Science Technician 2 Lower Professional 
 
2 Architects, Engineers, Technologists & Surveyors 1 Upper Professional 
 
3 Engineering Technicians 2 Lower Professional 
 
4 Aircraft and Ships Officers 1 Upper Professional 
 
5 Life Scientists 1 Upper Professional 
 
6 Life Science Technicians 2 Lower Professional 
 
7 Physicians (all, allopathic, homeopathic, veterinary, dental) 1 Upper Professional 
 
8 Nurses and medical technicians 2 Lower Professional 
 
9 Scientific, Technical, Medical trained other 2 Lower Professional 
 
10 Mathematicians, statistician & related 1 Upper Professional 
 
11 Economist & related 1 Upper Professional 
 
12 Acccountants, auditors & related 1 Upper Professional 
 
13 Social scientists & related 1 Upper Professional 
 
14 Jurists 1 Upper Professional 
 
15 Teachers 6 Teachers 
 
16 Poets, authors, journalists & related 2 Lower Professional 
 
17 Sculptors, painters, creative 2 Lower Professional 
 
18 Composers and performing artists 2 Lower Professional 
 








    
 
20 Elected & Legislative Officials 3 Managers 
 
21 Administrative & exec. Officers Govt. & local bodies 3 Managers 
 
22 
Working Proprietors, Directors & managers,  
Wholesale & retail trade 4 Proprietors 
 
23 Directors & managers, Financial Institutions 3 Managers 
 
24 Working proprietors & managers, Mining, Construction, Mfg. 4 Proprietors 
 
25 Working Profpiertors, Transport, Storage & communication 4 Proprietors 
 
26 Working Proprietors, Directors, Managers Other 4 Proprietors 
 
29 Administrative, Executive, Managerial workers n.e.c. 3 Managers 
Clerical and  
Related Workers 
    
 
30 Clerical and Other Supervisors 5 Clerical 
 
31 Village Officials 5 Clerical 
 
32 Stenographers, Typist, Tape & punch operators 5 Clerical 
 
33 Book-keepers, cashiers and related workers 5 Clerical 
 
34 Computing Machine Operators 5 Clerical 
 
35 Clerical and related workers n.e.c. 5 Clerical 
 
36 Transport and Communication Supervisors 5 Clerical 
 
37 Transport conductors and guards 16 Transport 
 
38 Mail distributors and related workers 16 Transport 
 
39 Telephone and telegraph operators 5 Clerical 
Sales workers 
    
 
40 
Merchants and shopkeepers, Wholesale and  
retail (Wholesale is propr) 4 & 7 
Proprietors &  
Merchants 
 
41 Manufacturers' agents 2 Lower Professional 
 
42 Technical salesmen and commercial travellers 2 Lower Professional 
 
43 Salesmen, shop assistants and related 8 Salesmen 
 
44 Salesmen - insurance, real estate, securites, business services 2 Lower Professional 
 





49 Sales workers n.e.c. 8 Salesmen 
Service workers 
    
 
50 Hotel and Restaurant Keepers 7 Merchants 
 
51 Housekeepers, matrons, stweards (domestic & institutional) 9 Service 
 
52 Cooks, waiters, bartenders and related (domestic & institutional) 9 Service 
 
53 Maids & other house keeping service workers n.e.c. 9 Service 
 
54 Building caretakers, sweepers, cleaners and related workers 9 Service 
 
55 Launderers, dry-cleaners and pressers 9 Service 
 
56 Hair dressers, barbers, beauticians and related workers 9 Service 
 
57 Protective service workers 9 Service 
 
59 Service workers n.e.c. 9 Service 
Farmers, Fisherman, 
Hunters, Loggers and 
Related Workers 
    
 
60 Farm Plantation, Dairy and other Managers and Supervisors 12 Planter 
 
61 Cultivators (Tenant & Owner) with land less than 5 acres 10 Small Farmers 
 
61 Large Farmers (land cultivated > 5 acres) 11 Large Farmer 
 
62 Farmers other than cultivators 12 Planter 
 
63 Agricultural laborers 13 Farm Labor 
 
64 Plantation Laboreres and Related Workers 14 Other Agr. Labor 
 
65 Other farm workers 14 Other Agr. Labor 
 
66 Forestry workers 14 Other Agr. Labor 
 
67 Hunters and related workers 14 Other Agr. Labor 
 
68 Fishermen and related workers 14 Other Agr. Labor 
Production and Related 
Workers, Transport  
Equipment Operators and 
Laborers  
    
 
71 Miners, Quarrymen, Well Drillers and related workers 15 Machine Operators 
 
72 Metal Processors 15 Machine Operators 
 
73 Wood preparation workers and paper makers 18 Laborers 
 





75 Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers 16 Artisan 
 
76 Tanners, Fellmongers and Pelt dressers 16 Artisan 
 
77 Food and beverage processors 18 Laborers 
 
78 Tobacco preparers and tobacco product makers 18 Laborers 
 
79 Tailors, dressmakers, sewers, upholsterers and related workers 16 Artisan 
 
80 Shoe makers and leather good makers 16 Artisan 
 
81 Carpenters, cabinet makers and related wood workers 16 Artisan 
 
82 Stone cutters and carvers 16 Artisan 
 
83 Blacksmith, tool makers and machine tool operators 15 Machine Operators 
 
84 Machinery fitters, assemblers, and precision instrument makers 15 Machine Operators 
 
85 Electric fitters and related electric, electronic workers 15 Machine Operators 
 
86 Broadcasting equipment and sound equipment operators 15 Machine Operators 
 
87 Plumbers, welders, sheet metal and structural metal workers 15 Machine Operators 
 
88 Jewellery and precious metal workers 15 Machine Operators 
 
89 Glass formers, potters and related workers 16 Artisan 
 
90 Rubber and plastic product makers 15 Machine Operators 
 
91 Paper and paper board makers 15 Machine Operators 
 
92 Printing and related workers 15 Machine Operators 
 
93 Painters 18 Laborers 
 
94 Production and related workers n.e.c. 15 Machine Operators 
 
95 Bricklayers and other construction workers 18 Laborers 
 
96 
Stationary engines and related equipment operators, oilers and 
greasers 15 Machine Operators 
 
97 
Material handling and related equipment operators, loaders, 
unloaders 18 Laborers 
 
98 Transport equipment operators 17 Tansport 
Workers not classified by 
occupation 
   
 







Table III: Average expenditure on school fees by states, IHDS (2005).  
   
 
Average expenditure 
on school fees 
Expenditure  
category state 
Jammu & Kashmir 3536.47 High 
Himachal Pradesh 3576.01 High 
Punjab 4166.9 High 
Uttarakhand 2300.65 Medium 
Haryana 3481.34 High 
Delhi  2866.52 Medium 
Uttar Pradesh 1374.59 Low 
Bihar 1254.69 Low 
Jharkhand 1725.80 Low 
Rajasthan 1755.39 Low 
Chattisgarh 1027.09 Low 
Madhya Pradesh 1067.49 Low 
North East 3059.21 High 
Assam 944.03 Low 
West Bengal 2306.16 Medium 
Orissa 1121.69 Low 
Gujarat 2257.98 Medium 
Maharasthra, Goa 1411.46 Low 
Andhra Pradesh 2065.23 Medium 
Karnataka 2508.68 Medium 
Kerala 3208.30 High 






Table IV: Average number of ideal children and number of living children by caste 
background, IHDS (2005)  
   
 
Average number  
of  
ideal children 
Average number  
of  
living children 
Brahmins 2.19 2.21 
Other Upper 
Caste  2.20 2.22 
Other 
Backward  
Castes 2.42 2.44 
Scheduled 
Castes 2.45 2.53 
Scheduled 
Tribes 2.64 2.49 
Muslims 2.76 2.77 
Sikhs, Jains 2.08 2.23 






Table V: Average number of ideal children and number of living children by 
women's age, IHDS (2005).  






Average number  
of  
living children 
18- 23 years 2.24 1.16 
24- 29 years 2.29 2.12 
30- 34 years 2.44 2.60 






Table VI: Average number of ideal children and number of living children by location, 
IHDS (2005).  
   
 
Average number  
of  
ideal children 
Average number  
of  
living children 
Rural 2.55 2.54 
Urban 2.25 2.31 






Table VII: Average number of ideal children and number of living children by (men's) 
education background, IHDS (2005).  
   
 
Average number  
of  
ideal children 
Average number  
of  
living children 
Illiterate 2.66 2.75 
Primary education 2.505 2.62 
Upper primary  
education 2.42 2.44 
Secondary 
education 2.304 2.28 
Senior secondary 
education 2.27 2.19 






Table VIII: Average number of ideal children and number of living children by 
occupation groups, IHDS (2005).  






Average number  
of  
living children 
Professionals 2.15 2.102 
Businessmen 2.36 2.46 
Farmers 2.53 2.57 
Laborers 2.56 2.54 






Table IX: Association between ideal and living number of children and level of income,  





Ideal number of children 
Dependent Var: 




Model 1 Model 2 




  Men's years of  

























Caste (Reference group: 
Brahmins) 

































Wife's age  
(Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 













Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 








  Wife's years of  





Number of  
observations 26,330 27,636 
   






Table X: Association between Desired Number of Children and Income level in the 
context of average expenditure on education at the level of the state, controlling for wife’s 




Ideal number of children 
Dependent Var: 






Model 1 Model 2 








 Occupations (Reference 
group: Non- Professionals) 





Expenditure on tuitions 
(Reference group: High 
expenditure states) 









Interaction term 1 
(Professionals * Medium 





Interaction term 2 
(Professionals * Low 




 Caste (Reference group: 
Brahmins) 
































Women's age (Reference 
group: 
18- 23 years) 












 Location (Reference  
group: Rural areas) 








 Wife's years of  




 Number of  
observations 26,451 27,764 
  




Table XI: Association between ideal and living number of children and level of income, 
controlling for men's years of education, occupation and other background characteristics 




Ideal number of 
children 
Dependent Var: 
Living number of  
children 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Log of personal income -0.0118 0.0116 
 
(0.0176) (0.0160) 
Men's years of  




(Reference group:  
Professionals) 
  Business 0.197** 0.368*** 
 
(0.101) (0.0879) 
Farmers 0.383*** 0.385*** 
 
(0.0989) (0.0861) 
Laborers 0.308*** 0.262*** 
 
(0.0977) (0.0852) 





  Other Upper Caste -0.241*** -0.148* 
 
(0.0922) (0.0816) 
Other Backward Castes 0.248*** 0.178** 
 
(0.0855) (0.0762) 
Scheduled Castes 0.301*** 0.326*** 
 
(0.0891) (0.0798) 
Scheduled Tribes 0.497*** 0.140 
 
(0.0960) (0.0871) 
Muslim 1.084*** 0.853*** 
 
(0.0958) (0.0870) 
Sikh, Jain -1.068*** -0.343** 
 
(0.217) (0.170) 






Wife's age  
(Reference group: 
18- 23 years) 
  24- 29 years 0.353*** 1.851*** 
 
(0.0523) (0.0498) 
30- 34 years 0.734*** 2.714*** 
 
(0.0534) (0.0529) 
35 years and above 1.030*** 3.353*** 
 
(0.0480) (0.0497) 
Number of  
observations 16,206 17,060 
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